Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More Broadly by Steiker, Carol S. & Steiker, Jordan M.
  
  
155 
OPENING A WINDOW OR BUILDING A WALL?  THE EFFECT OF 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT DEATH PENALTY LAW AND ADVOCACY 
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE MORE BROADLY 
Carol S. Steiker* 
Jordan M. Steiker** 
Why care about the American death penalty at all?  It constitutes 
only a tiny part of the criminal justice system.  Fewer than 50 people 
were executed and slightly over 100 people were sentenced to death 
nationwide in 2007,1 while considerably over two million people re-
main incarcerated in the non-capital criminal justice system.  The 
death penalty does not even constitute a substantial part of our sys-
tem for punishing homicide.  In a country that has experienced be-
tween 15,000 and 20,000 homicides per year nationwide over the past 
decade,2 the number of capital sentences and executions last year 
looks particularly trivial.  The relative paucity of death sentences and 
executions does not disappear if we focus on the high-water marks for 
death-sentencing and executions in the modern era, with highs for 
death sentences in the 300s (per year, nationwide)3 and executions 
hovering close to 100 (per year, nationwide).4 
By any metric, capital punishment receives a disproportionate 
share of popular, political, and legal attention.  The sheer number of 
films, books, magazine, and newspaper articles discussing and depict-
ing capital cases would suggest that capital prosecutions, sentences, 
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and executions are far more common than they actually are.  On the 
political side, state legislatures devote considerable attention to pre-
vailing capital procedures and proposed reforms, despite, in relative 
terms, the extraordinary infrequency of capital cases and the increas-
ingly large share of state resources consumed by non-capital incar-
ceration.  At the federal level, Congress, which has virtually nothing 
to say about state non-capital policies, has sought to influence state 
postconviction procedures in capital cases by creating special rules in 
federal habeas for states that adopt preferred postconviction stan-
dards for representation in capital cases.5  The complete absence of 
any federal policy addressing the states’ unprecedented experiment 
with mass incarceration stands in notable contrast to Congress’s at-
tention to the ways in which federal review of capital cases can influ-
ence state capital policies. 
On the legal side, observers have long noted the disproportionate 
presence of capital cases in state and federal litigation of criminal is-
sues.  One reason the death penalty remains more expensive than 
long-term incarceration (even incarceration for life) is the fact that 
states give capital defendants—and only capital defendants—the 
right at several different stages to challenge their convictions and sen-
tences.  Whereas non-capital inmates often are afforded only discre-
tionary review to the highest state court on direct appeal, capital in-
mates have review as of right.  Whereas indigent non-capital inmates 
have no right to counsel in state postconviction and federal habeas 
proceedings, and must therefore litigate pro se (if at all), indigent 
death-sentenced inmates are generally provided counsel in both state 
and federal postconviction litigation.  As a result, criminal litigation 
at the highest levels, even of non-capital issues, disproportionately oc-
curs in capital cases.  Moreover, the growth of distinctive doctrines 
surrounding the administration of capital punishment (concerning 
voir dire practices, the adequacy of state capital statutes, and propor-
tionality limits on the imposition of the death penalty) has contrib-
uted to the disproportionate presence of capital cases on the docket 
of the Supreme Court.  Whereas capital defendants account for con-
siderably less than one-tenth of one percent of criminal defendants 
prosecuted for crime in any given year, capital cases have occupied 
somewhere between one-quarter and one-half of the state criminal 
cases within the Court’s docket over the past decade.  Indeed, if one’s 
exposure to the American criminal justice system were confined to 
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attending arguments and reading opinions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, one might believe that capital prosecutions greatly outnumber 
speeding violations, burglaries, or drug offenses. 
Given the astronomical rise in our non-capital prison population 
and the enormous social, political, and economic consequences of 
such growth, what could explain or justify the extraordinary attention 
directed toward our prevailing capital practices?  One answer that 
progressive reformers of the criminal justice system might offer is that 
the drama and high political salience of capital punishment opens a 
window to the entire criminal process and generates constitutional 
doctrines and criminal justice policies that might never otherwise 
come into being as a consequence of the much greater indifference 
that courts, policy makers, and the general public display toward non-
capital criminal proceedings.  To bolster such a claim, such reformers 
could point to cases like Norris v. Alabama6 or Strickland v. Washington,7 
in which the Supreme Court generated important constitutional 
holdings for all criminal defendants in cases involving capital trials.  
Or they could point to the reforms that were promoted and adopted 
in the wake of dramatic death row exonerations, including DNA 
preservation and testing, mandatory videotaping of confessions, and 
higher evidentiary thresholds for the admission of jailhouse infor-
mant testimony.  Such reforms have the potential to benefit non-
capital criminal defendants, though it took the horror of the possibil-
ity of executing innocent persons to galvanize such reforms.  The 
death penalty, on this view, keeps criminal justice issues at the fore-
front of political and legal debate, and concerns about the fairness 
and reliability of the death penalty might trickle down to the much 
larger non-capital realm. 
This is a comforting story, but there is a potentially darker story 
here as well.  The advocacy efforts and the procedural and substan-
tive successes of the abolitionist movement may contribute to the 
“walling off” or even affirmative disadvantaging of “ordinary” non-
capital criminal defendants.  In this Article, we focus on several ways 
in which the salience of the death penalty in American criminal jus-
tice debates and litigation might entrench attitudes and practices 
detrimental to the non-capital side of the docket. 
In terms of advocacy, the focus on innocence in the capital con-
text, though it has brought some salutary reforms, also tends to de-
 
 6 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (holding that defendant was denied equal protection based on the 
exclusion of persons of his race from the jury). 
 7 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (recognizing constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel). 
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flect focus from non-innocence related issues such as discrimination, 
inadequate representation, and excessive punishment (even for those 
guilty of the underlying offense).  We believe that these issues are of 
far greater significance and deserving of more attention than the is-
sue of wrongful convictions in the capital context, though we recog-
nize that concerns about executing the innocent have struck a chord 
in popular sentiment and produced a wave of critical attention fo-
cused on the American death penalty.  It is too early to tell whether 
the innocence revolution will lead to the beginning of the end of the 
American death penalty or stabilize the death penalty by prompting 
the adoption of reforms intended to reduce the risk of executing in-
nocents. 
At the same time, an innocence focus on the non-capital side 
seems like a less promising tradeoff for those concerned about the 
prevailing pathologies within our non-capital system.  Innocents are 
undoubtedly included in the growing ranks of the incarcerated.  But 
the problems with mass incarceration as a social policy extend far be-
yond “wrongful convictions.”  In particular, the sheer punitiveness of 
our current non-capital system is unlikely to be challenged by a focus 
on innocence.  Many of the reforms generated by an innocence focus 
tend to reinforce the basic “justice” of non-capital convictions and 
sentences of the “guilty,” thereby deflecting more encompassing chal-
lenges to the status quo.  In addition, trumpeting the vindication of 
the innocent as the highest value within our criminal justice system 
undermines the appropriate and traditional role of defense lawyers in 
their representation of clients, including the guilty. 
Another major policy focus on the abolitionist side has been to 
support life-without-possibility-of-parole (“LWOP”) as a sentencing 
alternative to the death penalty.  The widespread adoption of this al-
ternative has likely contributed substantially to the extraordinary de-
cline in death sentencing nationwide—a greater than 50% decline 
over the past decade.  Here, too, reform of the death penalty has had 
its costs for non-capital inmates.  In order to prevent death sentences 
and executions, abolitionists have championed LWOP as a workable 
and humane alternative to the death penalty.  Over the past decade, 
the number of inmates sentenced to LWOP has climbed astronomi-
cally, and it may well be that the widespread adoption of LWOP, 
achieved in part because of the alliance of the abolitionist left and 
tough-on-crime right, has significantly increased the sentences of the 
many in order to make less likely the already unlikely execution of 
the few. 
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On the doctrinal side, some of the most significant limitations on 
the implementation of the death penalty have been achieved only by 
expressly relegating non-capital defendants to lesser protections.  The 
Court’s increasingly robust proportionality doctrine in capital cases 
has been withheld from non-capital defendants, with the result that 
there are virtually no judicially-imposed limits on the length of sen-
tences for non-capital offenders, even for non-violent offenses.  Simi-
larly, the constitutional regulation of counsel has increased substan-
tially in capital cases over the past decade, at least in the Supreme 
Court, while the performance of counsel in non-capital cases remains 
largely unregulated.  In both of these areas, the additional protec-
tions for capital defendants may not have caused the Court to forego 
greater protections for non-capital defendants, but the methodology 
of treating capital cases differently has tended to both obscure and 
normalize the pathologies that afflict non-capital criminal punish-
ment. 
In addition, perceived problems on the capital side have gener-
ated pro-prosecution reforms that have had severe adverse conse-
quences for non-capital inmates.  Legislative reform of federal habeas 
corpus, for example, designed to reduce delays in capital litigation 
and accelerate executions, resulted in significant and unprecedented 
limitations on the availability of federal review of federal issues arising 
out of state criminal cases.  These limitations were applied broadly to 
both capital and non-capital offenders.  In this circumstance, the sali-
ence of the death penalty and the visible delays in capital litigation 
were used to justify widespread restrictions on the ability of state non-
capital inmates to challenge their convictions and sentences in fed-
eral court. 
These varied examples suggest that the interests of capital defen-
dants as a group and the interests of the much larger class of ordinary 
criminal defendants may diverge much more frequently and substan-
tially than their lawyers and (few) advocates acknowledge.  Death 
penalty “reforms” may undermine the prospects for reform of our 
growing non-capital system.  We do not offer a strategic account for 
balancing the interests of non-capital and capital defendants.  How 
these conflicts should be addressed within the small community of ac-
tivists and lawyers who work on capital and criminal justice issues and 
cases remains a difficult and open question.  The obvious starting 
point, however, is to recognize that such conflicts exist. 
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I.  ABOLITIONIST ADVOCACY:  THE INNOCENCE REVOLUTION AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF LIFE-WITHOUT-POSSIBILITY-OF-PAROLE AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO DEATH 
We are now in the second reformist moment of the modern 
American death penalty.8  The animating concern for this era of re-
form is the danger of executing innocents.  This focus differs consid-
erably from the concerns of the earlier era, which focused more 
broadly on the arbitrary and discriminatory implementation of the 
death penalty as well as its unnecessary severity.  In the account that 
follows, we describe how the earlier period of reform linked the prob-
lems of the death penalty to the broader criminal justice system and 
viewed abolition or reform of the death penalty as consistent with a 
more encompassing critique of American criminal justice practices.  
Today, the abolitionist or reformist focus on the horror of wrongful 
convictions is largely distinctive to the death penalty and tends to ob-
scure, and perhaps even entrench and legitimize, pathologies on the 
non-capital side. 
A. A Period of Convergence:  Critiques of the Death Penalty Tied to Broader 
Reform of American Criminal Justice 
Although the United States is widely viewed as an outlier among 
Western democratic countries both in its retention of the death pen-
alty and in its punitive non-capital system, the United States was an 
outlier in the other direction soon after its founding.  The colonies 
that formed our nation inherited the death penalty from England, 
and throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the death 
penalty was an accepted and unremarkable part of colonial criminal 
justice.9  Soon after independence, though, Enlightenment ideals 
prompted criminal justice reform.10  In several states, such reform in-
cluded radically limiting the reach of the death penalty, even in cases 
 
 8 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence:  The Attraction and Limi-
tations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L & 
CRIMINOLOGY 587, 589–96 (2005) (discussing the period of capital punishment reform in 
the modern era). 
 9 RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 5 (1991) (indicating that “the 
institution of capital punishment in the colonies was merely an extension of an English 
legal tradition”). 
 10 WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 3–6 (1974) (discussing the influence of the 
work of Italian abolitionist Cesare Beccaria on Pennsylvania reformers, including Dr. Ben-
jamin Rush, Benjamin Franklin, and Pennsylvania’s Attorney General William Bradford). 
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of murder.11  The desire to cabin the death penalty was motivated in 
part by an emerging belief in the redemptive potential of incarcera-
tion.  It is no accident that the center of early death penalty reform in 
the United States—Pennsylvania—was also the birthplace of the 
American penitentiary.  In 1794, Pennsylvania restricted the death 
penalty to “first degree” murder and punished lesser offenses with 
imprisonment.12  Within a few decades, Pennsylvania embarked on its 
experiment with large-scale penitentiaries which promised to replace 
corporal punishments (including the death penalty) with lengthy 
solitary confinement. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, several states had abolished the 
death penalty (Michigan, 1846; Rhode Island, 1852; and Wisconsin, 
1853), but most retained it.  Few jurisdictions joined these abolition-
ist states during the latter half of the nineteenth century.  Although 
numerous jurisdictions abolished the death penalty toward the end of 
the Progressive Era (nine states between 1911 and 1917),13 many re-
stored it in the wake of the First World War and the Red Scare.14  The 
most significant change in capital practices concerned the rejection 
of the mandatory death penalty; retentionist jurisdictions steadily 
moved toward sentencer discretion in capital cases beginning in the 
1830s, with the result that the mandatory death penalty was virtually 
abolished nationwide by the 1960s.15 
From the Founding Generation until the 1960s, the American 
death penalty was almost entirely a function of state law beyond the 
reach of federal regulation.  The federal Constitution supplied few 
protections for state defendants beyond the general rights to due 
process and equal protection, which the Supreme Court construed 
quite narrowly; until the 1960s, the detailed list of procedural and 
substantive guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights ran against only 
federal authorities.  Accordingly, the few capital claims that reached 
the Court, including challenges to modes of execution (such as elec-
trocution), were almost uniformly rejected.  The notable exception 
was the Court’s recognition in one of the “Scottsboro Boys” cases of 
the right to state-appointed counsel in cases where the death penalty 
is at issue.16 
 
 11 Id. at 5 (discussing Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 6. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 7–9. 
 16 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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The death penalty as an American practice reached its height dur-
ing the Depression, with a national average of more than 165 execu-
tions per year in the 1930s.17  Executions began to decline, though, 
and by the first half of the 1960s, the nationwide average fell to 36 
per year.18  One explanation for the decline in executions is the de-
cline in the raw number of homicides; the number of homicides na-
tionwide exceeded 10,000 per year throughout most of the 1930s, a 
number that would not be reached again until the mid-1960s.19  But 
the number of executions per homicide decreased steadily as well, with 
a high of about 2 executions per 100 homicides during the peak pe-
riod in the 1930s and a low of less than 0.5 executions per 100 homi-
cides during the first half of the 1960s.20 
The modern era of death penalty reform began in the 1960s with 
a confluence of events.  On the political side, the death penalty was a 
natural target for the Civil Rights Movement given the unmistakable 
racial aspects of its use.  By the late 1950s, the Southern face of the 
death penalty had become more pronounced as death sentences and 
executions were increasingly confined to southern and border states.  
The racial tilt of the death penalty was particularly evident in capital 
rape prosecutions, as literally all of the 455 executions for rape after 
1930 in the United States occurred in southern states, border states, 
and the District of Columbia.21 
On the legal side, the Supreme Court began to reform states’ 
criminal justice systems generally and hinted at the reform of the 
death penalty in particular.  In a series of landmark decisions, the 
Warren Court extended most of the protections of the Bill of Rights 
to state criminal proceedings, including rights to counsel and trial by 
jury, and rights against double jeopardy, compulsory self-
incrimination, and unreasonable searches and seizures (as well as ac-
companying prophylactic exclusionary rules); most importantly for 
capital punishment, in 1962 the Court incorporated and extended 
 
 17 WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE:  DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864–1982, at 
25–26 (1984) (detailing executions, homicides, and execution rates by year for the 
United States from 1930 to 1967). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Marvin E. Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in BOWERS, supra 
note 10, at 109, 113. 
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against the states the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishments.22 
With respect to the death penalty, in 1963 the Court signaled its 
unprecedented willingness to subject capital punishment to constitu-
tional constraint.  Despite the near total absence of federal constitu-
tional law regarding the death penalty, three Justices issued a dissent 
from denial of certiorari on the question of whether the death pen-
alty is disproportionate for the crime of rape.23  Although the dissent-
ing Justices did not mention race in their opinion, the clearest evi-
dence that the death penalty constituted excessive punishment for 
rape was its racially discriminatory imposition:  African Americans ac-
counted for about 90% of the defendants executed nationwide for 
rape during the period between 1930 and 1967, but for less than 50% 
of those executed for murder.24 
The Court’s message spurred the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund 
(“LDF”) to increased action on the death penalty, and the LDF’s 
principal argument against the death penalty focused on its arbitrary 
and discriminatory use.  From the LDF’s perspective, limitation or 
abolition of the death penalty was part of the same project to improve 
the rights of African American criminal defendants in the South—the 
persistence of the death penalty was yet another manifestation of the 
distinctive form of Southern justice. 
In response to the Court’s opinion, the LDF funded empirical re-
search to document the influence of race in capital sentencing for 
rape.25  The LDF also embarked on a more ambitious “moratorium” 
strategy to end executions in the United States.26  The moratorium 
strategy was rooted in the belief that the death penalty had essentially 
run its course.  Executions had declined substantially and become 
even more geographically confined, and public opinion, especially in 
the wake of the Vietnam War, was skeptical of governmental power to 
end life.  A 1966 Gallup Poll revealed for the first—and only—time 
 
 22 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that imprisonment for status of be-
ing an addict constituted cruel and unusual punishment). 
 23 Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari). 
 24 MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL:  THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 75 (1973). 
 25 See id. at 75–78. 
 26 Id. at 107. 
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that more Americans opposed than supported the death penalty as 
punishment for murder.27 
The moratorium strategy was facilitated by the Court’s recognition 
of new criminal protections in state proceedings, but the LDF also 
raised new challenges distinctive to the death penalty.  These claims 
centered on three features of American capital punishment:  the 
practice of excluding jurors with any reservations about the death 
penalty from capital juries, the failure of capital jurisdictions to spec-
ify the criteria justifying the imposition of death (or life), and the re-
fusal of some states to permit evidence or arguments related solely to 
the appropriate punishment (apart from guilt or innocence of the 
underlying offense). 
Remarkably, the moratorium strategy succeeded, at least as meas-
ured by the goal of bringing a halt to executions in the United States.  
Beginning in 1967, the United States went almost a decade without 
executions, the longest such period in American history.  The claims 
raised by the LDF shared common themes.  First, the death penalty, 
though widely available in the United States, had declining support, 
and the procedures states used (such as death-qualifying juries and 
unitary proceedings) tended to obscure society’s emerging reserva-
tions about the death penalty.  Second, the broad schemes of death 
eligibility and the absence of standards to guide sentencer discretion 
had transformed the American death penalty into a national lottery—
there was no reason to believe that the few offenders sentenced to 
death were more deserving than the much larger group of offenders 
who were spared.  Third, the extraordinary discretion afforded capi-
tal sentencers at a time of declining support for the death penalty 
contributed to its discriminatory (race- and class-based) imposition; 
the death penalty could be tolerated in part because of its infre-
quency coupled with its use only against marginalized populations. 
These critiques of the death penalty borrowed from the larger cri-
tique of American criminal justice.  Too much discretion throughout 
the criminal justice system—beginning with the work of police and 
extending to the work of prosecutors and juries—contributed to an 
inequitable system in which certain groups, particularly racial minori-
ties, enjoyed fewer freedoms and experienced greater punishments 
than the rest of society.  The Warren Court response on the non-
capital side was to craft bright-line rules limiting discretion with the 
hope of establishing a general rule of law.  On the capital side, the 
 
 27 Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty Opinion, 1936–1986:  An Overview, in THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA:  CURRENT RESEARCH 115, 116 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991). 
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Warren Court suspected that the death penalty was already on a 
course toward extinction and that if capital practices were modified 
to ensure equal participation on juries and equal treatment of of-
fenders, the American public would in fact reject the death penalty. 
The reform movement culminated with the Court’s invalidation 
of existing state statutes in Furman v. Georgia.28  The terse per curiam 
opinion for the Court simply declared that “the imposition and carry-
ing out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment.”29  Each of the five Justices who supported the 
judgment wrote separate opinions defending this conclusion, and the 
common thread of their opinions focused on the arbitrary imposition 
of the punishment.  Justice Douglas amplified the theme of discrimi-
nation, indicating that the prevailing practice which reserved the 
death penalty only for the poor and unpopular could not be salvaged 
simply because such discrimination was not found on the face of state 
statutes.30  Justices Marshall and Brennan went further and argued 
that the death penalty could no longer be squared with prevailing 
standards of decency.31 
Noticeably absent, from a present perspective, was any serious at-
tention to the problem of wrongful convictions.  This paucity of 
treatment is especially telling given that the collection of opinions in 
Furman constituted the longest decision in the Court’s history at the 
time of its issuance.  In a time of declining executions (with no exe-
cutions in the four years preceding the decision), the Court’s focus 
was on the rarity of the punishment and the problems associated with 
infrequent application of a broadly available sanction.  The death 
penalty was not deemed abhorrent because of its careless, over-
zealous, indiscriminate use, but its virtual disuse.  As Justice White ar-
gued, the death penalty could not possibly serve any valid penological 
purpose (such as deterrence or retribution) if it was so seldom im-
posed.32  Justice White’s critique pointed to the same conclusion ad-
vanced by Justices Marshall and Brennan:  if the death penalty no 
longer secured any obvious social benefits, the punishment was ex-
cessive and unnecessary.  But Justice White was not prepared to em-
brace this conclusion as a constitutional matter without giving the 
states a chance to reform their systems. 
 
 28 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 29 Id. at 239–40. 
 30 Id. at 255–56 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 31 Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 32 Id. at 312–13 (White, J., concurring). 
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The Furman Court clearly misread the public mood.  Given the 
option of repealing or reforming their capital statutes, most capital 
jurisdictions chose the latter.  Many of these states even seemed to 
prefer a much broader capital regime (with the promise of many 
more executions) by creating mandatory death penalty schemes that 
required the imposition of death for murder (and, in some cases, 
other offenses).  A larger group of states sought to address the prob-
lem of unbridled sentencer discretion by specifying “aggravating fac-
tors” that would structure the capital sentencing decision.  With ris-
ing rates of violent crime and the resulting popular backlash against 
the Warren Court’s reforms, the states sought to reassert their pre-
rogative to punish murder with death. 
When the Court addressed the new statutes in 1976, it upheld the 
guided discretion statutes and invalidated the mandatory ones.33  Al-
though the mandatory statutes held out greater promise of address-
ing one of the central problems Furman had identified—that the 
sheer rarity of death sentences and executions rendered its few appli-
cations arbitrary and unnecessary—the Court rejected the mandatory 
statutes on the ground that they denied offenders individualized 
treatment, precluded sentencers from considering relevant mitigat-
ing factors, and departed significantly from longstanding American 
practices.34  The guided discretion statutes that the Court embraced 
raised new problems of their own:  although they purported to nar-
row sentencer discretion by requiring jurors to find an aggravating 
circumstance (beyond the plain fact of murder) to impose the death 
penalty, they preserved considerable sentencing discretion to with-
hold the death penalty for virtually any reason.  Whereas Furman 
condemned the arbitrary and discriminatory results of unfettered 
discretion, the 1976 decisions and their progeny viewed discretion as 
an unavoidable part of capital sentencing.  More importantly, those 
decisions appeared to treat the constitutionality of the American 
death penalty as turning on whether state statutes sought to guide dis-
cretion in a meaningful manner, not on whether states actually 
 
 33 See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating Louisiana’s mandatory 
death penalty sentencing scheme); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (invalidating North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty sentencing 
scheme); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas’s special issue scheme 
against facial challenge); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida’s 
guided discretion statute against facial challenge); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
(upholding Georgia’s guided discretion statute against facial challenge). 
 34 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289–301. 
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achieved any discernible level of consistency in the application of the 
death penalty. 
The 1976 decisions stabilized the American death penalty, and 
executions resumed shortly thereafter.  By the early 1980s, with the 
newly declared War on Drugs in response to the influx of crack co-
caine and the much higher violent crime rate that accompanied it, 
the politics of criminal justice veered markedly away from reform.  
Constitutional regulation of criminal practices was widely viewed as 
an obstacle to successful anti-crime efforts, and the Warren Court’s 
effort to promote social justice through criminal justice reform was 
rejected as naïve and misguided.  Incarceration rates, both absolute 
and per capita, rose sharply, as both the federal government and 
states responded to the threat of disorder with increased punitive 
measures. 
In this context, the Court addressed the most serious challenge to 
the death penalty.  Just as it had in the 1960s, the LDF sought to ex-
pose the role of race in capital sentencing.  After soliciting a compre-
hensive study of the administration of the death penalty in Georgia, 
the LDF insisted that sophisticated statistical analysis revealed the 
prominent role of race—particularly the race of victims—in capital 
punishment decisionmaking.  Whereas Furman had relied on suspi-
cions of arbitrariness and discrimination to invalidate the death pen-
alty, the LDF now supplied what appeared to be an empirical demon-
stration of the race-based administration of capital punishment.  The 
LDF’s hope was that the Court would not tolerate continued use of 
the death penalty in light of such evidence. 
In 1987, the Court rejected the claim in McCleskey v. Kemp,35 
though it assumed for purposes of its decision that the study fairly 
identified race-based disparities in capital decisionmaking.  Accord-
ing to the Court, such disparities were likely the inevitable result of 
the constitutionally required discretion in capital cases.  Moreover, 
the Court was unwilling to treat the death penalty differently than in-
carceration:  if race-based disparities condemned the death penalty, 
then they might condemn incarceration as well.  According to the 
Court, because “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not limited in applica-
tion to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties[,] . . . . if we 
accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted 
the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar 
claims as to other types of penalty.”36 
 
 35 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 36 Id. at 315 (citations omitted). 
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McCleskey marked not only the end of arbitrariness- or discrimina-
tion-based challenges the death penalty, but also highlighted the im-
portance of framing constitutional challenges to the death penalty in 
uniquely capital terms.  Given the Court’s increased hostility to War-
ren Court supervision of criminal justice policies and its decreased 
enthusiasm for policing the fairness of the non-capital system, attacks 
on capital practices had to prevent spillage over to the non-capital 
side. 
In the wake of McCleskey, with the Court’s rejection of what 
seemed to be the last global challenge to the American death penalty, 
executions increased substantially and the death penalty as a practice 
seemed secure for at least another generation.  Death-sentencing 
rates rose to modern era highs in the mid-1990s, and executions went 
from about eighteen per year nationwide in the last half of the 1980s 
to about sixty-six per year in the late 1990s.37  Previously abolitionist 
New York joined the ranks of death penalty states in 1995, and the 
Oklahoma City bombing resulted in congressional legislation in-
tended to accelerate executions. 
B. A New Reformist Era Focusing on Wrongful Convictions 
But public and professional opinion seemed to shift quickly and 
dramatically with the discovery of numerous wrongful convictions in 
Illinois.  The issue emerged as lawyers and journalists uncovered 
more than a dozen cases of innocents who had been erroneously sen-
tenced to death.38  In one particularly alarming case, the inmate, An-
thony Porter, had come perilously close to execution before journal-
ism students exposed the actual perpetrator of the crime.39  The 
circumstances of his case and the post-conviction investigation made 
clear that it was entirely a matter of fortuity that Porter had not been 
executed before his innocence had been established.  A broader in-
vestigation into Illinois capital practices revealed numerous systemic 
defects, including prosecutorial misconduct.  As these defects came 
to light, George Ryan, the Republican Governor, declared a morato-
rium on executions and ultimately commuted the sentences of the 
167 inmates on Illinois’ death row.  Ryan developed a national repu-
tation as a crusader against wrongful convictions (though he was later 
 
 37 See Executions by Year, supra note 1. 
 38 See Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness:  Why We Are Moving Towards Moratoria on Exe-
cutions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733, 739–41 
(2001). 
 39 Id. at 739. 
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prosecuted for and convicted of unrelated corruption), and the 
events in Illinois prompted other states to reexamine their capital sys-
tems. 
The newfound skepticism about the accuracy of convictions was 
reinforced by the emerging use of new DNA technology to uncover 
wrongful convictions (both capital and non-capital).  The capacity of 
such technology to expose error was vividly illustrated with the 2000 
publication of Actual Innocence:  Five Days to Execution and Other Dis-
patches From the Wrongly Convicted,40 which detailed the successful ef-
forts of Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld in their pioneering use of 
DNA to exonerate convicted capital and non-capital inmates.  These 
and other DNA exonerations fueled public concerns about the falli-
bility of our criminal justice system. 
Concerns about wrongful convictions generated two types of re-
form.  First, states enacted backward-looking provisions authorizing 
post-conviction DNA testing in cases where genetic material is avail-
able and new technology could cast doubt on the reliability of the ex-
isting conviction; many states also established compensation funds for 
those wrongly convicted and exonerated through post-conviction test-
ing.  Second, states have looked closely at the sources of error in the 
wrongful conviction cases and considered some reforms to prevent 
such errors in the future.  The wrongful conviction cases provide a 
promising starting point to “audit” prevailing investigative and prose-
cutorial practices, and they have revealed some common sources of 
error:  misidentification by eyewitnesses, inappropriate reliance on 
“junk” forensic science, misuse of jailhouse informant testimony, and 
the exaction and use of false confessions, especially in cases involving 
youthful or mentally disabled suspects. 
To date, although many states have enthusiastically embraced the 
“backward-looking” reforms providing for post-conviction access to 
DNA testing and for compensation in cases of wrongful conviction, 
few have actually reformed their systems regarding the investigation 
and prosecution of crime.41  Only a handful of states have altered 
 
 40 JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:  FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES 
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000). 
 41 Compare Innocence Project, Reforms by State, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView1.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (show-
ing states that have adopted compensation schemes), and 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView2.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (show-
ing states that provide access to DNA testing), with Innocence Project, Reforms by State, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView3.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (show-
ing states that require recorded interrogations), and 
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their policies regarding the recording of interrogations, embraced 
new procedures for eyewitness identifications, or created criminal jus-
tice reform commissions to prevent wrongful convictions in the fu-
ture.42  Given the relatively small number of actual DNA exonerees 
over the past decade or so (somewhere between 200 and 250), and 
the reluctant embrace of related criminal justice reform by states, it 
appears that the innocence “revolution” has had much less practical 
significance for incarcerated inmates than for the American death 
penalty. 
On the capital side, concerns about executing the innocent may 
have contributed to the precipitous and astonishing drop in capital 
sentences over the past eight years.  Moreover, concerns about 
wrongful executions have no doubt contributed to the palpable shift 
in momentum from expansion to contraction of capital punishment 
within the United States.  Whereas the 1980s and 1990s saw many 
states expand their categories of death-eligible offenses and revamp 
their procedures to facilitate increased executions, the post-Illinois 
experience has produced increased circumspection about capital 
punishment.  States have entertained—and in some instances em-
braced—serious proposals to enhance accuracy in capital cases, to 
halt executions pending further study, and to abolish the death pen-
alty altogether.  Indeed, New York declined to revive its death penalty 
after its courts found correctible errors in the state capital statute, 
and New Jersey recently joined the cohort of abolitionist states 
through legislative abolition.  Executions have declined dramatically 
(2007 saw fewer than half the number of executions nationwide than 
were conducted in 2000),43 propelled by a judicially-enforced national 
moratorium on executions in the wake of litigation surrounding the 
constitutionality of existing lethal injection protocols. 
Moreover, concern about wrongful convictions has surfaced in 
several high-profile judicial opinions, suggesting that the courts have 
recognized the emerging power of such an appeal in restraining the 
reach of the death penalty.  In 2002, a federal district judge in New 
York found the federal death penalty unconstitutional because of the 
excessive risk of wrongful convictions (though the decision was 
 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView5.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (show-
ing states that have reformed eyewitness identification procedures), and 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView6.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (show-
ing states with criminal justice reform commissions). 
 42 See supra note 41. 
 43 Executions by Year, supra note 1. 
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quickly reversed by the Court of Appeals).44  In Kansas v. Marsh,45 a 
relatively insignificant case focusing on a highly technical issue within 
Kansas’s capital statute, four Justices joined a remarkable dissent 
highlighting the risk of wrongful capital convictions.  Marsh ad-
dressed whether a state statute can require jurors to impose death 
where the aggravating and mitigating factors in the case are in equi-
poise.  At the time the issue reached the Court, Kansas had a death 
row population under ten and had not executed any offenders in 
over four decades.  The Court’s majority opinion was unremarkable, 
holding that previous cases permit the death penalty to be imposed 
in such circumstances.  Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by three other 
Justices, developed a sustained critique of the American death pen-
alty in light of the recent documentation of wrongful convictions.  
According to Justice Souter, the uncovering of pervasive error in 
capital cases amounts to a “new body of fact [that] must be accounted 
for in deciding what, in practical terms, the Eighth Amendment 
guarantees should tolerate.”46  His dissent recounts the experience in 
Illinois, discusses the role of DNA in identifying innocents on death 
row, and offers statistics about the number of “exonerated” inmates 
in recent years.  In light of such evidence, Justice Souter argues for a 
new death penalty principle that would invalidate any state proce-
dures that unnecessarily increase the risk of error in capital cases.  
Just as the challenged Kansas procedure allowed “ties” to generate 
death sentences, Justice Souter seemed to advocate for a new rule of 
capital jurisprudence that invalidates any questionable state proce-
dural policies in capital cases. 
Justice Souter’s opinion seems self-consciously designed to bring 
the public debate about the reliability of the American death penalty 
into the Court’s jurisprudence.  This approach is markedly different 
from the Furman-era focus on the arbitrary and discriminatory char-
acter of the administration of the death penalty.  Indeed, a little over 
a decade before Marsh, the Court seemed notably unmoved by the 
claim that the risk of error in capital cases requires special post-
conviction procedures to prevent the execution of the innocent:  the 
Court refused to recognize a due process right to a judicial forum to 
present newly discovered evidence of innocence in capital cases.47  
 
 44 United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 313 F.3d 49 (2d 
Cir. 2002). 
 45 548 U.S. 163 (2006). 
 46 Id. at 207–08 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 47 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
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Moreover, Justice Souter’s opinion is sweeping in its potential.  He 
insists that the events in Illinois and elsewhere have ushered in a “pe-
riod of new empirical argument about how ‘death is different,’”48 and 
his declaration that “it is far too soon for any generalizations about 
the soundness of capital sentencing across the country”49 seems to 
signal that such generalizations may well be on the horizon. 
More recently, Justice Stevens, who co-authored the joint opinion 
reviving the death penalty in the wake of Furman (but who joined Jus-
tice Souter’s dissent in Marsh), announced his view that the American 
death penalty has essentially run its course and can no longer be 
squared with the Constitution.  In so doing, Justice Stevens joined 
three of his retired colleagues (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun) in declaring that the death penalty had become unconsti-
tutional, though he indicated that he would not act on his view until 
an appropriate case raised the issue.  In this respect, Justice Stevens, 
like Justice Souter, chose a somewhat odd vehicle to issue broad pro-
nouncements respecting the death penalty:  Justice Stevens an-
nounced his new view in Baze v. Rees,50 the case upholding prevailing 
lethal injection protocols against constitutional challenge.  Justice 
Stevens concurred in the result, though he also suggested that states 
wishing to avoid further constitutional and practical difficulties 
“would do well” to reconsider their current protocols.51 
Justice Stevens then offered a lengthy critique of American capital 
punishment, insisting that the retention of the death penalty by vari-
ous actors (including state legislatures, Congress, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court itself) was, in his view, the “product of habit and inat-
tention rather than an acceptable deliberative process that weighs the 
costs and risks of administering that penalty against its identifiable 
benefits.”52  Justice Stevens detailed numerous defects in the Ameri-
can system of capital punishment, including its diminishing or un-
proven contribution to any valid penological goals (including deter-
rence or retribution), its arbitrary and discriminatory use, and its 
reliance on skewed jury pools for its continued viability.  But the fac-
tor Justice Stevens identified as of “decisive importance” was its ir-
revocability, coupled with the recent experience of an “unacceptable 
 
 48 Marsh, 548 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 49 Id. 
 50 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). 
 51 Id. at 1546 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 52 Id. 
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number” of defendants wrongfully convicted of capital murder.53  Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, “[t]he risk of executing innocent defen-
dants can be entirely eliminated by treating any penalty more severe 
than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as constitu-
tionally excessive.”54 
Thus, the problem of wrongful convictions has tipped the scales 
for at least one member of the Court from constitutional permissibil-
ity to constitutional violation.  The Stevens concurrence in Baze and 
the Souter dissent in Marsh suggest that the innocence revolution 
might provide the framework for the ultimate judicial abolition of the 
death penalty, a prospect that seemed remote at best not more than a 
decade ago. 
Notwithstanding the apparent popular and political traction of 
the wrongful conviction issue, and its potential leverage in constitu-
tional adjudication in restraining or abolishing the death penalty, we 
have previously expressed concerns about the potential costs of an 
innocence focus in capital law and advocacy.55  First, we rejected the 
claim that executing innocents is categorically different from a range 
of other harms that are present in the capital punishment system.  
Moreover, we maintained that these latter problems—including the 
arbitrary and discriminatory administration of the death penalty and 
the execution of guilty but undeserving or impaired offenders—are 
far more ubiquitous than the problem of wrongful executions.56  We 
also feared that an innocence focus in the capital context might over-
shadow or affirmatively undermine other important critiques of the 
American death penalty, including challenges based on claims of 
fairness or human dignity.57  Lastly, we lamented the potential of the 
innocence revolution to undermine traditional public defense values 
by bolstering the message that actual innocence is the true measure 
of a defendant’s worthiness of representation (as illustrated by new 
innocence projects that explicitly condition representation on a col-
orable claim of actual innocence).58 
Despite these concerns, we remain unsure whether the new focus 
on innocence marks the first substantial step down the path to aboli-
tion or whether it is a transient phenomenon sustained by an unusual 
 
 53 Id. at 1551. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 8, at 607–23. 
 56 Id. at 606. 
 57 Id. at 615–16. 
 58 Id. at 618–21. 
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confluence of social and political factors (including stable or declin-
ing violent crime rates, an unpopular war, and growing skepticism 
about the benign character of government).  Given the legal land-
scape prevailing just five or ten years ago, we would not have ex-
pected the questions surrounding wrongful convictions to have sur-
faced as quickly and as powerfully as they recently have in the Souter 
and Stevens opinions discussed above.  These decisions suggest that 
the innocence revolution might well have significance for the consti-
tutional status of the death penalty—an undoubtedly extraordinary 
development. 
Here, though, we raise slightly different concerns about the inno-
cence revolution.  The transformative capacity of the innocence revo-
lution on the capital side—its potential to reform or abolish the 
death penalty—seems much greater than its capacity to improve or 
transform our non-capital system.  As noted above, the legislative re-
action to the problem of wrongful convictions has focused primarily 
on post-hoc DNA testing and compensation for the wrongfully con-
victed.  Broad reform of investigative and prosecutorial practices has 
been tentative and more controversial.  Whereas numerous advo-
cates, public officials, and judges regard the fallibility of the death 
penalty as a plausible ground for its rejection, no one regards the fact 
of wrongful convictions as a basis for jettisoning incarceration.  The 
prospect of wrongful convictions becomes a basis for increasing our 
reliance on incarceration and reducing executions, not necessarily a 
basis for reducing incarceration overall. 
Perhaps more importantly, many of the costs of an innocence fo-
cus are even more acute on the non-capital side.  Over the past three 
decades, we have embarked on an unprecedented experiment with 
mass incarceration.  The jail and prison population of the United 
States has grown eight-fold over the past thirty-five years.  In addition 
to imprisoning the most inmates in absolute terms worldwide, the 
United States also has an incarceration rate that is five to eight times 
higher than other Western industrialized nations; we have recently 
achieved the dubious distinction of imprisoning more than one out 
of every hundred American adults.  Much of the expansion of the 
prison population is attributable to more punitive sentencing re-
gimes, especially for non-violent offenders.  National spending on in-
carceration has reached unprecedented levels, with estimates that 
states and the federal government spend over $65 billion annually to 
house the more than 2.3 million inmates held nationwide.  Moreover, 
the rate of incarceration in minority populations is particularly high,  
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with one in nine black males between the ages of 20 and 34 behind 
bars. 
Despite the enormous social and political costs of our mass incar-
ceration policies, reform efforts have been unable to reverse the re-
markable trends.  We fear that the presence of the death penalty, as 
well as the focus on actual innocence, undermines the prospects for 
non-capital reform.  First, the innocence critique tends to focus on 
the selection of those to be incarcerated rather than on the patholo-
gies of incarceration policy.  Tinkering with the investigation and 
prosecution of crime will leave untouched the prevailing punitive 
framework.  The one important link between wrongful convictions 
and excessive punitiveness is frequently missed in public and profes-
sional debate:  the presence of extremely harsh sanctions encourages 
plea-bargaining, and when the plea-bargain discount is sufficiently 
high, excessive punishments encourage the innocent to plead guilty.  
But few advocates of reform have sought to attack the problem of 
wrongful convictions by reducing the harshness of our current sanc-
tions.  Second, the focus on innocence also tends to legitimate and 
entrench the justice of harshly punishing the guilty.  Likewise, the 
more precariously held values of fairness, non-discrimination, ade-
quate representation and procedural regularity are endangered by 
equating “injustice” with inaccuracy. 
Apart from the focus on innocence, current abolitionist advocacy 
tends to reinforce rather than question increasingly punitive sanc-
tions.  This dynamic is most evident in death penalty opponents’ sup-
port for harsh incarceration sanctions (including LWOP) as a way of 
undermining support for the death penalty.  In this respect, aboli-
tionists deflect arguments about the ways in which lengthy incarcera-
tion (and the absence of alternative sanctions) undermines human 
dignity:  lengthy incarceration is viewed as a “lesser” evil instead of as 
an evil in itself. 
It remains unclear whether and to what extent opposition to the 
death penalty has facilitated the now near-universal embrace of life-
without-possibility-of-parole in American jurisdictions.  LWOP is an 
extraordinarily recent phenomenon, and its adoption coincided with 
both the rise in violent crime rates and the destabilitization of the 
death penalty that began in the 1970s.59  Some states clearly adopted 
LWOP in direct response to the Court’s constitutional regulation of 
the death penalty:  Alabama, Illinois, and Louisiana adopted such 
 
 59 Note, A Matter of Life and Death:  The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punish-
ment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840–41 (2006). 
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statutes for the first time in response to Furman, fearing that the abo-
lition of the death penalty would leave no other means of protecting 
the community from violent murderers.60  But LWOP has also 
emerged in virtually all capital and non-capital jurisdictions,61 making 
it difficult to understand LWOP merely as an alternative to death. 
In some jurisdictions, however, the connection between anti-death 
penalty advocacy and the adoption of LWOP is unmistakable.  In 
Texas, for example, death penalty opponents long sought the adop-
tion of LWOP as the alternative punishment to death in cases of capi-
tal murder.  Texas prosecutors, fearing that the LWOP alternative 
would reduce the prospects for death verdicts, consistently and vigor-
ously opposed the LWOP alternative.  Only after the Court invali-
dated the death penalty as applied to juvenile offenders were death 
penalty opponents able to overcome prosecutorial resistance, and 
only because prosecutors now viewed LWOP as increasing rather than 
decreasing the maximum punishment available for juveniles.62 
The benefits and costs of the abolitionist embrace of LWOP are 
uncertain.  Abolitionists clearly believe that the LWOP alternative will 
reduce use of the death penalty, and opinion polls consistently show 
significantly lower support for the death penalty where LWOP is of-
fered as an alternative punishment.  Moreover, the astonishing de-
cline in death sentencing over the past decade is likely attributable in 
part to the increased availability of LWOP as an alternative sentenc-
ing option.63 
But the obvious cost of this abolitionist strategy is to normalize 
and legitimate LWOP as a punishment.  And the number of poten-
 
 60 Id. at 1841. 
 61 Every state but New Mexico and Alaska currently permits the imposition of LWOP.  See 
Death Penalty Information Center, Life Without Parole, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/life-without-parole. 
 62 The developments in Texas are recounted in A Matter of Life and Death, supra note 59, at 
1843–44. 
 63 See id. at 1850 (arguing that the enactment of LWOP statutes is correlated with a small 
decrease in death sentences).  We believe that the correlation might be greater than sug-
gested by this article because the author focuses on whether declines in death sentences 
were immediately realized after the adoption of LWOP.  The most significant reason for 
the enormous decline in death sentences over the past decade is the willingness of prose-
cutors to accept pleas to LWOP.  We believe that this institutional shift in prosecutorial 
attitudes and practices does not happen overnight in response to legislative change, even 
if the legislative change in fact permits the shift in policy.  Indeed, the presence of LWOP 
makes it easier for prosecutors to respond to other concerns about the death penalty (e.g., 
the possibility of wrongful convictions) with greater willingness to accept pleas, because 
fear of a defendant’s eventual release is often the biggest obstacle to persuading victims’ 
families to support a negotiated settlement. 
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tially death-sentenced defendants spared because of the LWOP alter-
native pales in comparison to the enormous number of non-death-
eligible inmates who are now without hope of parole because of 
LWOP’s widespread adoption.64  Anti-death penalty advocacy may not 
be wholly responsible for the widespread entrenchment of LWOP, 
but it certainly undermines the emergence of a progressive assault on 
the practice.  Unless and until the death penalty is abolished, LWOP 
will be embraced by many progressive criminal justice reformers as a 
necessary but regrettable alternative to the perceived greater evil. 
II.  DOCTRINAL WALL-BUILDING 
It should not be surprising that the distinctiveness of capital litiga-
tion produces legal doctrine that has different salience in capital ver-
sus non-capital litigation.  After all, if the special context of capital 
punishment creates distinctive incentives in the arena of advocacy, as 
discussed above, we should expect the results of that advocacy—
whether in judicially created constitutional doctrine or legislation—
to reflect the same potentially troubling double edge.  Though there 
are many examples, large and small, of ways in which the distinctive-
ness of capital punishment law might redound to the detriment of 
ordinary criminal defendants, here we will highlight three of the 
most significant and overarching areas.  The first—constitutional lim-
its on excessive punishment—is an example of a single constitutional 
provision (the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and un-
usual punishments) that has resulted in two formally distinct lines of 
doctrine in the capital and non-capital contexts.  The second—the 
constitutional regulation of the effectiveness of defense counsel—is 
an example of a doctrine that does not purport to distinguish for-
mally between capital and non-capital cases, but that nonetheless has 
distinctive consequences in the two contexts.  The third—judicial and 
legislative revamping of the scope of federal habeas corpus review—is 
an example of the “specialness” of capital punishment leading to nar-
rowed protection for all convicted offenders, rather than to special 
protections limited only to capital defendants.  Each of these areas of 
law offers insight into how the settled acceptance that “death is dif-
ferent” may obscure or normalize pathologies that afflict non-capital 
criminal punishment. 
 
 64 Id. at 1851–52 (detailing the extraordinary increase of state inmates sentenced to LWOP 
in recent years, including inmates otherwise ineligible for the death penalty). 
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A.  Constitutional Proportionality Doctrine 
The divergence of constitutional doctrine in capital and non-
capital cases is nowhere more evident than in the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of excessive or disproportionate punishment under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  
Though the Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment places 
substantive limits on both capital and non-capital punishments, the 
Court has developed two distinct lines of doctrine for the two differ-
ent contexts.  Indeed, these two lines of doctrine have diverged radi-
cally from their common constitutional origins in the Eighth 
Amendment, remaining virtually hermetically sealed from each other 
and resulting in two quite differently demanding thresholds for judi-
cial invalidation of legislatively sanctioned punishment. 
Consider first the development of the Court’s proportionality doc-
trine in capital cases.  Just one year after the Court reauthorized capi-
tal punishment in Gregg v. Georgia and its accompanying cases65 (re-
jecting the global claim that capital punishment is in all cases cruel 
and unusual punishment), the Court invalidated the death penalty as 
being a disproportionate punishment for the particular crime of the 
rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia.66  In Coker, the four-person 
plurality opinion established the basic framework that the Court has 
used ever since—though with some important recent refinements—
for considering claims that the imposition of the death penalty con-
stitutes “excessive” punishment under the circumstances.  Insisting 
that the Court’s judgment of the excessiveness of a punishment 
“should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible 
extent,”67 the Coker plurality sought “guidance in history and from the 
objective evidence of the country’s present judgment” about the ac-
ceptability of the death penalty for rape.68  The plurality first consid-
ered the record of state legislation on the issue, noting that at no 
point in the fifty years preceding its decision had a majority of states 
authorized the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman.  More-
over, at the moment of its decision, the state of Georgia was the only 
jurisdiction in the country to authorize capital punishment for that 
particular crime.69  The plurality then turned its attention to jury de-
 
 65 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  See supra note 33 for a list of accompanying cases. 
 66 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 67 Id. at 592. 
 68 Id. at 593. 
 69 Prior to the Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), sixteen states had 
authorized capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman, but by 1977, Georgia was 
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cisions in capital rape sentencings, noting that Georgia juries had 
imposed the death penalty for rape only six times since Furman, a 
number that represented less than 10% of all rape sentencings dur-
ing that period.  Finally, the plurality explained that consideration of 
objective evidence is only part of the required Eighth Amendment 
analysis, “for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability 
of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”70  Here, the plu-
rality emphasized that rape, in contrast to murder, does not end life:  
“Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life 
may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is 
not beyond repair.”71 
Five years later, Justice White, the author of the Coker plurality 
opinion, wrote for a majority of the Court in Enmund v. Florida,72 ap-
plying Coker’s methodology to invalidate the death penalty for a de-
fendant who had served as the getaway car driver in a felony murder 
but who had neither participated in the killing, nor attempted nor 
intended to kill.  Once again, the Court considered the number of 
jurisdictions (eight) that authorized capital punishment under these 
circumstances and the number of such defendants (three) whom ju-
ries had actually sentenced to death in the post-Furman era.  The 
Court elaborated a bit on its criteria, appearing to create a hierarchy 
among legislative data by noting particularly that none of the eight 
most recently enacted death penalty statutes authorized use of the pen-
alty in such circumstances.  Moreover, the Court acknowledged that 
prosecutorial charging decisions (though harder to document than 
jury verdicts) also constitute relevant objective evidence of changing 
societal values.  And the Court counted actual executions in addition 
 
alone.  The state of Georgia and the Coker dissenters argued, with some plausibility, that 
the precipitous decline in such statutes reflected some states’ attempts to respond to 
Furman by passing mandatory capital statutes, which required them to narrow capital 
categories more than they might otherwise have done.  The majority acknowledged that 
this dynamic may have played some role in the decline, but concluded that it was not a 
large enough role to overcome the overwhelming lopsidedness of the snapshot count of 
current state legislation (forty-nine to one).  See Coker, 433 U.S. at 595. 
 70 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597. 
 71 Id. at 598.  The Court recently extended its holding in Coker to include the rape of chil-
dren, striking down a Louisiana statute allowing the death penalty for child rapists.  Ken-
nedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).  The analysis in Kennedy closely tracked that of 
Coker and of the Court’s more recent decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), 
and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  See infra text accompanying notes 80–97. 
 72 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
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to jury verdicts, remarking that there had been no executions of non-
triggerman felony murderers since 1955. 
In bringing its own judgment to bear (“it is for us ultimately to 
judge”73), the Court noted that Enmund, like Coker, had not actually 
taken a life.  Here, too, the Court further elaborated, considering 
whether the use of the death penalty in this context measurably con-
tributed to either of the “two principal social purposes” of capital 
punishment—“retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by pro-
spective offenders.”74  Deterrence failed as a justification for En-
mund’s punishment, reasoned the Court, because the threat that the 
death penalty will be imposed for murder will not deter those who do 
not kill or intend to take life.  Moreover, retribution failed because 
Enmund’s lack of intent suggested that his criminal culpability 
should be limited to his participation in the underlying felony (a 
robbery) rather than extend to the murder committed by co-
defendants more culpable than he. 
Although the Court modified the Enmund holding five years later 
in Tison v. Arizona,75 it nonetheless reaffirmed its Coker/Enmund 
methodology.  The Tison Court emphasized that the legislative head 
count had been altered by “substantial and recent legislative authori-
zation of the death penalty for the crime of felony murder regardless 
of the absence of a finding of an intent to kill”76 and that the jury ver-
dict picture had been altered by the willingness of state courts to im-
pose and uphold death sentences even absent findings of intent.77  In 
bringing its own judgment to bear, the Court explained that the 
mental state of reckless disregard for human life was equivalent in 
moral culpability to an intent to kill and noted that both the common 
law and the Model Penal Code treated a high degree of recklessness 
as a legal equivalent to intent in their definitions of murder.78 
The Court’s story of Eighth Amendment restrictions on the sub-
stantive scope of the death penalty seemed to come to a close in 
1989, when the Court rejected two key challenges to the scope of the 
death penalty, upholding capital punishment for juvenile offenders 
 
 73 Id. at 797. 
 74 Id. at 798 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). 
 75 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (authorizing under the Constitution capital punishment for nontrig-
german felony murderers who played a substantial role in the underlying felony and 
evinced reckless disregard for human life). 
 76 Id. at 154. 
 77 Id. at 154–55. 
 78 Id. at 157. 
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and for offenders with mental retardation.79  More than a dozen years 
passed without any further discussion by the Court of Eighth 
Amendment capital proportionality.  Then, in its recent opinions in 
Atkins v. Virginia80 and Roper v. Simmons,81 overturning the 1989 deci-
sions, the Court endorsed the basic structure of its prior Eighth 
Amendment proportionality doctrine while radically expanding the 
scope of relevant considerations.  In Atkins, the Court held that the 
death penalty may not constitutionally be imposed on offenders with 
mental retardation.  It framed its analysis in the now-familiar terms of 
its prior capital proportionality cases, first considering “objective evi-
dence” of national consensus and then bringing its “own judgment” 
to bear “by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judg-
ment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”82 
On the straight numbers alone, Atkins did not look like a strong 
case for the existence of a national consensus against executing of-
fenders with mental retardation.  Of the thirty-eight states that re-
tained the death penalty, only eighteen explicitly forbade the prac-
tice.  The Court noted several key facts in support of its 
characterization of this head count as a consensus.  First, the Court 
counted the twelve abolitionist states as states opposing the practice 
of executing offenders with mental retardation.  Second, the Court 
noted that sixteen of the eighteen retentionist states that prohibited 
the practice had passed legislation doing so within the past dozen 
years:  “It is not so much the number of these States that is signifi-
cant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”83  The Court ob-
served both the generally unpopular nature of statutory protections 
for violent criminals and the overwhelming legislative support for the 
particular protection at issue (that is, the balance of votes for and 
against) in the legislatures that passed the ban.  To this evidence of a 
legislative trend, the Court added the fact that only a relatively low 
number of states (five) actually performed executions of offenders 
with mental retardation in the almost thirteen years since Penry. 
Most controversially, the Court added in a footnote that 
“[a]dditional evidence makes it clear that this legislative judgment re-
 
 79 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (finding no constitutional bar to the execution 
of juvenile offenders); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (finding no constitutional 
bar to the execution of offenders with mental retardation). 
 80 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 81 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 82 536 U.S. at 312–13. 
 83 Id. at 315. 
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flects a much broader social and professional consensus.”84  This addi-
tional evidence consisted of the official positions of “several organiza-
tions with germane expertise,”85 the views of “widely diverse religious 
communities,”86 the practices of “the world community,”87 and domes-
tic polling data.88  The Court stated that “these factors are by no 
means dispositive,” but explained that “their consistency with the leg-
islative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is 
a consensus among those who have addressed the issue.”89 
Turning from objective evidence of consensus to its own view, the 
Court considered “the relationship between mental retardation and 
the penological purposes served by the death penalty.”90  As in En-
mund, the Court limited itself to two purposes:  retribution and deter-
rence.  The Court found that neither purpose would be measurably 
advanced by the execution of offenders with mental retardation.  As 
for retribution, the Court concluded that the cognitive deficiencies 
that characterize offenders with mental retardation diminish their 
personal culpability so as to exclude them from the category of those 
“most deserving of execution.”91  As for deterrence, the Court found 
that the limited ability of offenders with mental retardation to “proc-
ess the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as 
a result, control their conduct based upon that information”92 sug-
gested that executing such offenders would not measurably further 
the goal of deterrence.  Finally, the Court’s own view was informed by 
procedural considerations regarding the risk of wrongful conviction 
as well—notably the greater likelihood that defendants with mental 
retardation might falsely confess, or that they might make poor wit-
nesses at trial or sentencing, or that they might generate fears about 
their future dangerousness in light of their disability. 
The Court emphatically underscored its Atkins analysis three years 
later in Simmons,93 overturning its 1989 Stanford decision that had 
permitted the execution of juvenile offenders.  The Court once again 
emphasized both objective evidence and the bringing of its own 
 
 84 Id. at 316 n.21. 
 85 Id. (citing amicus briefs from the American Psychological Association and the American 
Association on Mental Retardation). 
 86 Id. (citing amicus briefs from the United States Catholic Conference, et al.). 
 87 Id. at 317 n.21 (citing amicus brief from the European Union). 
 88 Id. (citing both state and national polls). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 317. 
 91 Id. at 319. 
 92 Id. at 320. 
 93 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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judgment to bear, explicitly overruling the Stanford Court’s rejection 
of the relevance of the Court’s independent judgment.  The objective 
numbers in Simmons were almost identical to those in Atkins—
eighteen of thirty-eight states prohibited the execution of juvenile of-
fenders, and only six states had carried out executions of juvenile of-
fenders in the years since Stanford (and only three states in the previ-
ous decade).  The Simmons claim was weaker than that in Atkins, 
though, because fewer of the bans on executing juvenile offenders 
were very recent:  there had been significantly less change on the 
ground since 1989, and thus it was harder to discern a newly emerg-
ing consensus.  Nonetheless, the Court found such a consensus, ob-
serving that it would be “the ultimate in irony” to decline to find a 
consensus when the slower pace of change in the juvenile context was 
due to the earlier recognition of the inappropriateness of executing 
juveniles.94 
But the Court gave the most sustained treatment to its analysis ap-
plying “its own judgment.”  The Court relied on important differ-
ences between juvenile and adult offenders to conclude that juveniles 
do not belong in the category of the “worst” offenders, in the sense of 
the most deserving.  The Court invoked both “scientific and socio-
logical studies” and what “any parent knows”95 to draw a portrait of 
juvenile offenders as more impulsive, immature, irresponsible, and 
susceptible to negative influences, while at the same time more likely 
to change and mature over time, than adult offenders.  These quali-
ties, concluded the Court, make juveniles both less deserving (from a 
retributive perspective) of society’s most severe sanction and less 
likely to be susceptible to deterrence.  The Court also moved part of 
its controversial footnote 21 from Atkins into text in Simmons, offering 
a full-throated defense of the relevance of the views and practices of 
other nations.  Noting that the United States was alone in the world 
in officially authorizing the execution of juvenile offenders, the Court 
firmly declared:  “The opinion of the world community, while not 
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant con-
firmation for our own conclusions.”96 
Though most famous and controversial for its defense of the rele-
vance of world opinion, the Supreme Court’s recent exposition of its 
capital proportionality doctrine in Atkins and Simmons is notable for 
 
 94 Id. at 567 (quoting State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 408 n.10 (Mo. 2003) 
(en banc) (reaching the same conclusion)). 
 95 Id. at 569. 
 96 Id. at 578. 
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our purposes—that is, in comparison to non-capital proportionality 
doctrine—in several other ways as well.  First, the cases are striking 
simply for their results—the reversal of two relatively recent prece-
dents, and the finding of national consensus against a particular 
death penalty practice in the face of disagreement by a majority of 
states that retained the death penalty.  Second, the Court’s approach 
to the question of consensus makes relevant a radically more expan-
sive range of information than earlier capital proportionality cases, 
ranging from more qualitative information about legislative change 
(its currentness, speed, degree of support, etc.) to information about 
the views of elites (experts, religious leaders, political elites abroad, 
etc.).  Finally, the Court’s “own judgment” is shaped by considering 
two—and only two—recognized purposes of capital punishment, ret-
ribution and deterrence.  The crucial exclusion of incapacitation 
from this list permits a plausible finding that the death penalty is in-
appropriate even for categories of offenders that include those who 
appear to pose a substantial risk of future danger. 
The Court’s development of its non-capital proportionality doc-
trine over the same thirty-year period provides a study in sharp con-
trasts, despite the fact that the two doctrines derive from the same 
constitutional provision and draw upon the same foundational cases.  
In both the capital and non-capital contexts, the Court almost always 
begins its constitutional analysis by paying lip service to Weems v. 
United States97 and Trop v. Dulles,98 two non-capital cases that estab-
lished that the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive punishments 
that offend “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.”99  Yet during the same period that the Court’s 
capital proportionality doctrine became more expansive in its scope 
of relevant considerations and more generous to criminal defendants 
in its outcomes, the Court’s non-capital proportionality doctrine be-
came more limited in its scope of relevant considerations and so def-
erential to state interests as to make Eighth Amendment challenges 
to excessive incarceration essentially non-starters. 
In the early 1980s, the Court dealt in quick succession with a series 
of cases challenging lengthy prison terms as excessive under the 
 
 97 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that punishment of twelve years jailed in irons at hard and 
painful labor for the crime of falsifying records was constitutionally excessive). 
 98 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (holding that loss of citizenship by a native-born citizen upon convic-
tion by a court-martial for wartime desertion was constitutionally excessive). 
 99 Id. at 101. 
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Eighth Amendment.  In the first case, Rummel v. Estelle,100 the Court 
upheld a life sentence (with possibility of parole) for a repeat of-
fender convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretences, who had 
previously been convicted of two even more petty frauds.  Over a dis-
sent by Justice Powell, a bare majority of the Court observed that “one 
could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felo-
nies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a 
state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is 
purely a matter of legislative prerogative.”101  Two years later, in Hutto 
v. Davis,102 the Court summarily reversed a grant of habeas relief to a 
defendant sentenced to forty years in prison and a fine of $20,000 for 
possession and distribution of approximately nine ounces of mari-
juana, holding that its decision in Rummel clearly doomed Davis’s 
challenge.  A single year later, however, the Court in Solem v. Helm103 
granted Eighth Amendment relief to a repeat offender who was sen-
tenced to life without possibility of parole for writing a “no account” 
check with intent to defraud, despite the fact that Helm had a more 
serious criminal history than Rummel (who had been denied relief 
three years previously).  Justice Powell, who had authored the dissent 
in Rummel, now authored the majority opinion in Solem v. Helm, laying 
out a proportionality test that, had it prevailed in later cases, would 
treat non-capital proportionality challenges roughly similarly to capi-
tal proportionality challenges. 
Justice Powell’s three-factor test required consideration of:  (1) 
“the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty”104; (2) 
“the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdic-
tion”105; and (3) “the sentences imposed for commission of the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.”106  Like the Court’s non-capital propor-
tionality doctrine, this test requires consideration of how “other ju-
risdictions” treat the same offense; it suggests that the weight or trend 
of practice outside of the challenged jurisdiction is highly salient.  
Moreover, the test’s requirement that judicial decision-makers weigh 
the “gravity” of the offense against the “harshness” of the penalty im-
plicitly requires the articulation of some normative framework for as-
 
100 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
101 Id. at 274. 
102 454 U.S. 370 (1982). 
103 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
104 Id. at 290–91. 
105 Id. at 291. 
106 Id. at 291–92. 
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sessing the fit of crime and punishment; any such assessment will in-
evitably resemble what the Court calls, in its capital proportionality 
cases, bringing its “own judgment” to bear.  (The last factor, number 
(2) in Justice Powell’s test, is a way of testing fit by reference to a par-
ticular jurisdiction’s already articulated normative vision in its treat-
ment of other offenses and offenders.) 
Justice Powell’s three-part test in Helm, though not articulated in 
the same terms as the capital proportionality cases decided almost 
simultaneously,107 invokes the same kind of “objective” evidence (in-
ter-jurisdictional comparison) and “judgment” about proportionality 
(gravity weighed against harshness), roughly speaking.  But this 
rough equivalence did not last long.  In its more recent non-capital 
cases, the Court sharply narrowed its proportionality analysis, even as 
it opened up its capital proportionality analysis.  In the very next non-
capital proportionality case after Helm, Harmelin v. Michigan,108 a ma-
jority of the Court rejected Justice Powell’s analysis—or rather, re-
fined it right out of existence.  The fractured majority consisted of 
two Justices who would have allowed no Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality review in non-capital cases and a three-Justice plurality who 
believed that the Eighth Amendment contained a much narrower 
proportionality principle than Justice Powell recognized in Helm.  Ac-
cording to the plurality, an Eighth Amendment challenge on propor-
tionality grounds can proceed only in the “rare”109 case in which the 
judicial decision-maker discerns a gross disproportionality between 
the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the punishment.  If a 
challenge clears this threshold test, then the judicial decision-maker 
may go on to perform the intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons 
called for by Helm in order to complete the proportionality analysis.  
If the threshold test is not met, however, no consideration of the 
other two factors is necessary. 
The application of this new threshold requirement of gross dis-
proportionality has proven to be an insurmountable hurdle for 
Eighth Amendment challenges to long prison terms.  In Harmelin it-
self, the Court upheld against constitutional challenge the imposition 
of a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole for a first-
time felony offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.  
 
107 Helm was decided in 1983, building on Powell’s Rummel dissent of 1980.  See supra notes 
100, 102.  Coker was decided in 1977, Enmund in 1982, and Tison in 1987.  See supra notes 
66, 72, 75. 
108 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
109 Id. at 1005. 
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Adverting to the gravity of the threats posed by the distribution of il-
legal drugs, the Court reasoned that Harmelin’s crime “threatened to 
cause grave harm to society”110 and that Michigan had “good reason” 
and “a rational basis”111 for its extremely harsh treatment of such of-
fenses.  The use of the phrase “rational basis” is particularly telling 
here, because it echoes the Court’s lowest tier of scrutiny for equal 
protection challenges to legislative classifications—challenges that 
almost never succeed.112  The Harmelin dissenters, in contrast, demon-
strated how the use of inter- and intra-jurisdictional analysis could 
make a crucial difference.  Looking within the state, the only other 
offense (aside from drug offenses) in Michigan for which mandatory 
life without possibility of parole was authorized was first-degree mur-
der; in contrast, second-degree murder, rape, and armed robbery did 
not carry such a harsh mandatory sentence.  Looking to other juris-
dictions, the dissenters noted that “[n]o other jurisdiction imposes a 
punishment nearly as severe as Michigan’s for possession of the 
amount of drugs at issue here.”113 
The difficulty of meeting the gross disproportionality threshold 
requirement was underscored by the Court’s most recent application 
of the test in 2003 in Ewing v. California.114  Ironically, this case was de-
cided between the Court’s two dramatic applications of its newly 
powerful capital proportionality doctrine in Atkins (2002) and Sim-
mons (2005).  In Ewing, the Court upheld the operation of Califor-
nia’s “three-strikes-you’re-out” law that resulted in a twenty-five-years-
to-life sentence for a repeat offender convicted of attempting to steal 
three golf clubs from a golf course pro shop.  In considering whether 
the sanction was grossly disproportionate to the offense, the Court in-
sisted that legislatures must remain free to decide for themselves what 
purposes they seek to advance in the criminal justice systems.  Rea-
soning that the state of California could reasonably believe that its 
harsh law would promote its interest in deterring crime (by inducing 
parolees to leave the state) and especially its interest in incapacitating 
offenders likely to recidivate, the Court held that Ewing’s was not 
“the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime commit-
 
110 Id. at 1002. 
111 Id. at 1004. 
112 See generally Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357 (1999) (cataloging and attempt-
ing to explain the few challenges that have succeeded under the Court’s usually exceed-
ingly deferential rational basis review). 
113 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
114 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
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ted and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross dispro-
portionality.”115  In a choice of quotation that reveals just how difficult 
the non-capital proportionality test is meant to be, the Ewing Court 
reached back to repeat approvingly the Rummel Court’s observation 
that the proportionality principle would “come into play in the ex-
treme example . . . if a legislature made overtime parking a felony 
punishable by life imprisonment.”116 
While the two lines of Eighth Amendment proportionality review 
in the capital and non-capital contexts might be thought unremark-
able considered separately, their juxtaposition inevitably creates a jar-
ring contrast and generates difficult questions.  Why is a national leg-
islative head count the objective touchstone for Eighth Amendment 
analysis in capital cases, while consideration of what other jurisdic-
tions do is not even part of the non-capital analysis unless some 
enormously high threshold of gross disproportionality is reached 
first?  Why is constitutional consideration given to elite expert and 
world opinion and to trends in practices in the capital context, but 
none in non-capital cases?  Why is incapacitation recognized as a le-
gitimate purpose of non-capital punishment, but not of capital pun-
ishment (when death is surely the only completely reliable means of 
incapacitation)?  How is it that the most serious drug sentence (by 
far) and the harshest “three strikes” statute in the entire country can 
withstand non-capital proportionality review, while on the capital 
side, a minority of retentionist jurisdictions can outlaw the execution 
of juvenile offenders and offenders with mental retardation every-
where?  The Court never answers these questions directly.  Indeed, it 
virtually never makes any explicit comparison between the two lines 
of doctrine.  Rather, it tends to ritualistically intone some version of 
its “death is different” mantra.  By implication, the Court seems to be 
suggesting that the unique severity and irrevocability of a sentence of 
death does and should make such sentences uniquely sensitive to a 
more heightened and sensitive proportionality analysis. 
The upshot, however, is that the “difference” of death has cabined 
searching proportionality review outside of the capital context.  One 
might argue that the development of more searching proportionality 
review on the capital side is actually a boon for all criminal defen-
dants, because the more demanding death penalty doctrine may 
eventually spill over into the non-capital side, and, in any case, it pro-
 
115 Id. at 30 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment)). 
116 Id. at 21 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980)). 
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vides a template for a more sensitive doctrine by expanding the range 
of relevant considerations and demonstrating how they might be de-
ployed.  There is no reason why this hopeful (from the perspective of 
defendants) prospect could never happen.  But exactly the opposite 
is what has actually occurred, and there is some reason to think that 
the causal influences run exactly contrary to the hopeful view.  A 
more pessimistic but probably more realistic view is that capital de-
fendants can succeed only on the condition that their success does not 
spill over into the non-capital side. 
First, the very same reasoning (from reduced culpability relative to 
other offenders) that excluded juveniles, offenders with mental re-
tardation, and (some) non-triggermen from the ambit of the death 
penalty might also exclude them from the next most serious punish-
ment, especially in jurisdictions that do not authorize capital pun-
ishment.  For the Court to avoid backlash in response to its narrowing 
of the scope of capital punishment (a response with which it is famil-
iar from its early death penalty cases), it needs to ensure that a very 
serious punishment remains unassailably available for those whom it 
exempts from death.  The best way to ensure this availability is to 
maintain a different proportionality analysis on the non-capital side. 
Second, the number of ordinary criminal defendants is larger, by 
orders of magnitude, than the number of capital defendants.  More-
over, the range of prison terms and other possible penalties is a 
broad continuum on the non-capital side, in contrast to the “on/off” 
switch of capital punishment.  These two facts together suggest a 
much more ominous threat of floodgates opening on the non-capital 
side than on the capital side of proportionality litigation.  Hence, one 
should expect to see exactly what has developed—that any develop-
ments in proportionality review on the capital side would be strictly 
confined and prevented from generating instability in the much lar-
ger and more amorphous arena of ordinary criminal punishment. 
But why should a Court that is clearly unwilling to regulate non-
capital sentences be so willing to intervene constitutionally on the 
capital side?  The text and history of the Eighth Amendment certainly 
does not call for such a sharp divide (or any divide at all) between 
these forms of punishment.  One could simply accept at face value 
the Court’s repeated observation that “death is different” from all 
other punishments in its severity and irrevocability.  Yet one could 
also add the observation that “death is different” in a few additional 
important ways.  First, the death penalty has enormous visibility and 
salience both within the United States as a symbol of crime policy and 
in the broader world as a symbol of American lack of respect for an 
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emerging world consensus on universal human rights.  Second, the 
death penalty is a tiny part of American crime policy, even in the 
states that use it the most.  Compare the current rate of about 50 exe-
cutions per year nationwide to the national incarceration rate of 
about 2.3 million people.  Any constitutional regulation of capital 
punishment thus will be both highly visible and relatively insignificant 
in its effect on national or state crime policy.  Whether intentional or 
not, the Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence offers a means to le-
gitimate American penal policy by ameliorating some of its harshest 
aspects and portraying the Court as a counter-majoritarian scrutinizer 
of state penal policy, while leaving the fundamental pillars of Amer-
ica’s true penal exceptionalism intact.  The United States’s claim to 
the title of the world’s leading incarcerator remains untouched by 
the constitutional regulation of capital punishment, yet such regula-
tion gets a disproportionate degree of attention because of the power 
of the death penalty as a symbol in numerous different arenas. 
As a result, constitutional regulation of capital punishment both 
obscures and normalizes the excesses of American penal policy.  The 
problems of mass incarceration, racial disparities in punishment, and 
the failed drug war are obscured because they inevitably fall into the 
shadows when the spotlights of national and world attention are fo-
cused by the Supreme Court on highly dramatic issues regarding 
American death penalty practices.  Moreover, extremely lengthy sen-
tences are normalized by capital litigation:  successful capital litigants, 
after all, are almost always “rewarded” with sentences of life without 
possibility of parole.  Even the lengthiest sentences lose their horror 
when they are so avidly sought and so victoriously celebrated by the 
(rarely) successful capital litigant.  In these ways, the success of capital 
litigants under the Eighth Amendment offers little comfort to and 
indeed likely limits the chances of successful challenges by non-
capital litigants. 
B.  Constitutional Regulation of Defense Counsel 
The regulation of the effectiveness of defense counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment presents some of the same potential dangers as 
Eighth Amendment proportionality regulation, but in a contrasting 
manner.  While the Supreme Court developed two distinct lines of 
doctrine under the Eighth Amendment for capital and non-capital 
litigants, the Court has always insisted that there is but a single stan-
dard for attorney competence under the Sixth Amendment.  In re-
cent years, however, the Court has applied this unitary standard in a 
much more demanding manner to capital defense counsel during 
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sentencing proceedings.  There is perhaps stronger reason in the 
Sixth Amendment context to think that this more demanding ap-
proach in capital cases may redound to the benefit of all criminal de-
fendants, but the distinct possibility remains that the Court’s dispa-
rate treatment of capital and non-capital cases will work to legitimate 
the patently inadequate criminal defense services that are all too of-
ten provided in ordinary criminal cases. 
The very case in which the Supreme Court first announced its 
current constitutional standard for the regulation of defense counsel 
made clear that the Court was unlikely to forge two separate stan-
dards for capital and non-capital cases.  Strickland v. Washington117 was 
a capital case in which the defendant had confessed and pleaded 
guilty (against the advice of counsel) to three capital murder charges.  
The Supreme Court case involved Washington’s later challenge on 
federal habeas corpus review, with new counsel, to the minimal sen-
tencing presentation by his trial counsel to the sentencing court.  
This challenge presented something of a mixed bag.  On the one 
hand, Washington’s defense counsel—perhaps from a sense of self-
confessed “hopeless[ness]”118—failed to do much of anything to pre-
pare for his client’s capital sentencing hearing.119  On the other hand, 
the vigorous investigation later performed by habeas counsel sug-
gested that there wasn’t a great deal of helpful information that 
could have been unearthed on Washington’s behalf.120  The Court 
concluded that neither prong of its newly minted test for establishing 
ineffective assistance of counsel had been met:  counsel’s investiga-
tion and presentation had not been shown to be constitutionally “un-
 
117 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
118 Id. at 699. 
119 Counsel spoke to the defendant’s mother and wife on the phone, but never met with 
them in person, nor contacted any other possible character witnesses, nor sought any in-
dependent psychological or psychiatric evaluation of his client, nor requested that the 
state conduct a presentence investigation.  Rather, counsel relied on Washington’s accep-
tance of responsibility for his crimes, his apparent lack of a criminal history (which a pre-
sentence investigation would likely have rebutted), and his self-described state of “ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance” (one of Florida’s statutory mitigating 
circumstances).  Id. at 672–74. 
120 There were more than a dozen friends, neighbors, and relatives who would have provided 
favorable character evidence.  This good character evidence, however, was undercut by 
Washington’s damning admissions to other criminal activity that had not been revealed 
during his initial sentencing proceeding, but would have been used to rebut the testi-
mony of the character witnesses.  Moreover, the psychological and psychiatric reports so-
licited by habeas counsel concluded that Washington was not under the influence of ex-
treme emotional disturbance at the time of crimes, though he was “chronically frustrated 
and depressed because of his economic dilemma.”  Id. at 675–77. 
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reasonable,” nor had Washington been shown to have been “preju-
diced” by his counsel’s alleged failings in the sense that there was no 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing would 
have been different but for his attorney’s failures.121 
Washington’s case clarified that capital sentencings and ordinary 
criminal trials alike are subject to the same overarching two-prong 
standard for assessing the constitutional adequacy of counsel.  More-
over, the case signaled very clearly that the bar was being set inten-
tionally high for the invalidation of criminal convictions (or capital 
sentences) on the ground of inadequate counsel.  The Court was re-
markably candid about its fear of opening the floodgates of litigation 
and the unfairness of evaluating attorney decision-making with the 
benefit of hindsight.122  Thus, the Court refused to create any “check-
list” of specific minimum requirements for adequate representation 
and exhorted lower courts to accord a “strong presumption” of ade-
quacy of representation and to give deference to attorney strategy.123  
Even the fairly general ABA Guidelines for the provision of defense 
services were not strongly endorsed by the Court; rather, they were to 
be treated as guides—“but . . . only guides”—for assessing the reason-
ableness of defense attorney choices in individual cases.124 
Thus, from the very beginning, Strickland appeared to be an equal-
opportunity obstacle to constitutional claims of inadequate counsel.  
Neither capital defendants nor ordinary criminal defendants were 
able to meet the very high showing required by the new test.  One 
early application of Strickland by the Supreme Court in a capital case 
demonstrated quite clearly how demanding the new standard was 
proving to be.  In Burger v. Kemp,125 the petitioner’s capital defense 
counsel presented no mitigating case whatsoever at his sentencing 
hearing, which resulted in a death sentence.  Indeed, counsel per-
formed virtually no investigation in preparation for the sentencing 
hearing.  Counsel had met with Burger for a total of only about six 
hours in preparation for both the guilt and the sentencing phase of 
his trial, and relied on his client to suggest possible witnesses or miti-
gating evidence by asking whether Burger could produce evidence of 
“anything good about him.”126  Unsurprisingly, this question did not 
 
121 Id. at 698–700. 
122 Id. at 689–90. 
123 Id. at 688–89. 
124 Id. at 688. 
125 483 U.S. 776 (1987). 
126 Id. at 813 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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elicit the information later compiled by habeas counsel of a what the 
district court called the petitioner’s “tragic childhood”127—a child-
hood marked by family turmoil, physical abuse, neglect, and psycho-
logical problems.  Although the Supreme Court concluded that trial 
counsel “could well have made a more thorough investigation than 
he did,”128 the Court ultimately concluded that counsel’s limited in-
vestigation could be viewed as a reasonable “strategic decision”129 in-
fluenced by “the defendant’s own statements or actions,”130 which had 
failed to alert counsel to the value of pursuing further mitigating evi-
dence.  Burger sent an unmistakable signal to lower courts about the 
deference they were to accord the choices of trial counsel, even in 
capital cases, when life was on the line.  As a result, Strickland claims, 
though ubiquitous and often reflecting egregiously poor lawyering, 
were virtually certain losers—a fact well recognized by lawyers and 
documented in reviews of both capital and non-capital litigation.131 
Against this backdrop, it was startling when the Supreme Court 
invalidated on Strickland grounds three separate capital sentences 
from three different states over a period of slightly more than five 
years (from 2000 to 2005).  Even more surprising was the fact that 
each of the three decisions reversed state court decisions despite the 
newly deferential standard of review imposed by the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).132  The three 
cases, read together, represent a sea change in the approach of the 
Supreme Court to the application of Strickland—at least in capital 
sentencing proceedings.  Whether all criminal defendants should 
take heart from this new scrutiny is, of course, another question. 
The first of the three cases, Williams v. Taylor,133 was the first Su-
preme Court case to interpret the new standard of review under 
AEDPA.  Despite the Court’s conclusion that Congress did indeed 
require greater deference to the legal analysis of state courts, the 
 
127 Id. at 794 (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930, 937–38 n.7 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 795. 
130 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)). 
131 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:  The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but 
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1857–66 (1994) (illustrating how inadequate capi-
tal defense services were tolerated under Strickland); William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strick-
land’s Tin Horn:  Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 91, 97–161 (1995) (illustrating Strickland’s failings in the wider run of criminal 
cases). 
132 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  
See infra text accompanying notes 149–66 for a more detailed discussion of AEDPA. 
133 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
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Court nonetheless rejected the conclusion of the Virginia Supreme 
Court that Williams had received effective assistance of counsel at his 
capital sentencing proceeding.  The scope of the decision in Williams 
was limited in that it dealt only with the “prejudice” prong of the 
Strickland test.  The state habeas trial court had found that Williams’ 
counsel had been ineffective at his sentencing hearing, and the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that trial counsel’s 
performance had indeed been deficient.  The only question before 
the U.S. Supreme Court was whether to affirm the Virginia Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that Williams had not been prejudiced by his law-
yer’s incompetence.  Thus, Williams was the exceedingly rare case in 
which the state and federal courts agreed that Strickland’s strong pre-
sumption of competent lawyering had been overcome.  This agree-
ment had a sound foundation:  Williams’ trial lawyer failed to un-
cover dramatic evidence of his client’s extreme mistreatment, abuse, 
and neglect as a child, testimony that his client was borderline men-
tally retarded and might have organic mental impairments, and pow-
erful testimony from the state’s own experts that Williams might not 
pose a danger in the future if incarcerated rather than executed.134  
As for the sentencing presentation, the Supreme Court acerbically 
noted that the bulk of defense counsel’s closing “was devoted to ex-
plaining that it was difficult to find a reason why the jury should spare 
Williams’ life.”135 
The Supreme Court rejected the Virginia Supreme Court’s analy-
sis of the “prejudice” prong on three grounds, one of which was pecu-
liar to the case, two of which were generalizable to other capital de-
fendants, but none of which had much relevance to the application 
of Strickland to ordinary criminal defendants.  The ground peculiar to 
the case was the Virginia Supreme Court’s strange characterization of 
the Strickland prejudice prong as somehow based on more than 
“mere” outcome determination—an analysis that led the Supreme 
Court to the highly unusual conclusion that, even under AEDPA def-
erence, the state court’s conclusion could not be upheld because it 
had simply applied the wrong legal standard.136  The two more gener-
alizable grounds were first, that the state court had failed to consider 
the totality of the mitigating evidence in the case (from both the trial 
and the later habeas proceeding), and second, that the state court 
had failed to give appropriate weight to the mitigating evidence un-
 
134 Id. at 370. 
135 Id. at 369. 
136 Id. at 397. 
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covered by habeas counsel by stressing the issue of future dangerous-
ness to the exclusion of moral culpability.137 
The first of these two more generalizable grounds might offer 
some modest assistance to non-capital defendants in that it suggests 
that various pieces of evidence that a trial lawyer erroneously fails to 
investigate and present must be considered in their totality.  But it is 
rarer outside the context of capital sentencing that a lawyer’s investi-
gative failures will be concentrated around a single issue (such as 
mitigation).  Thus, the aggregation principle for which Williams 
might plausibly stand offers substantially less assistance outside of the 
special context of investigation of mitigation.  Moreover, and much 
more powerfully, only in the capital context are defendants routinely 
appointed lawyers in state and federal habeas proceedings.  Because 
the inadequacy of trial counsel’s investigation can be demonstrated 
only by a more complete investigation by habeas counsel (consider 
the presentations in Strickland, Burger, and Williams), the Court’s will-
ingness to carefully consider the impact of such later investigations 
necessarily privileges the capital litigant over the non-capital litigant. 
The second of the two generalizable grounds is simply inapposite 
to non-capital litigation.  The Supreme Court’s insistence that the 
state court consider the relevance of mitigating evidence to the jury’s 
assessment of the defendant’s moral culpability (and not merely his 
future dangerousness) reflects the distinctive nature of the decision 
at issue in capital sentencing—the appropriateness of death as pun-
ishment.  In ordinary criminal trials, evidence that trial counsel fails 
to uncover and present on behalf of a client is assessed only against 
the government’s case for conviction, along the unitary dimension of 
“guilty” versus “not guilty.”  Capital cases have a more qualitative and 
inescapably moral dimension—even assuming that the defendant is 
guilty and eligible for capital punishment, is the defendant someone 
who ought to be put to death?  The considerations that inform this 
decision are different from the factual determinations that trial juries 
are called upon to make in ordinary criminal trials, and the Supreme 
Court’s admonition in Williams offers nothing that will impact deter-
minations of “prejudice” in ordinary criminal cases. 
In the second of the three startling reversals, Wiggins v. Smith,138 
the Court went much further than it had in Williams by addressing di-
rectly Strickland’s first prong, in particular, the requirements for rea-
sonable investigation.  As in all of the previous capital sentencing 
 
137 Id. at 397–98. 
138 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
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challenges under Strickland, Wiggins’s habeas counsel uncovered evi-
dence of a “bleak” life history—including “evidence of severe physical 
and sexual abuse petitioner suffered at the hands of his mother and 
while in the care of a series of foster parents.”139  In contrast to Wil-
liams (and also Strickland and Burger), however, Wiggins was repre-
sented at trial by two experienced and apparently able public de-
fenders, who devoted substantial time and thought to his defense, 
eventually committing themselves to a strategy of “residual doubt” at 
sentencing—arguing that even if Wiggins participated in some way in 
felony murder of the elderly victim, he was not the actual killer.  Al-
though trial counsel uncovered some evidence of Wiggins’s limited 
intellectual capacities and difficult life, they failed to uncover the 
dramatic evidence eventually compiled in the “social history” com-
missioned by habeas counsel.  The Supreme Court concluded that 
this failure constituted deficient lawyering under the Sixth Amend-
ment and that the Maryland courts’ conclusion to the contrary was 
not merely wrong, but unreasonably so. 
Some of the bases for the Court’s conclusions in Wiggins have 
more potential (not yet realized) to be broadly generalizable than the 
Court’s analysis in Williams.  First, in stark contrast to Burger, the 
Court rejected the state’s (and the dissent’s) attempt to portray coun-
sel’s failure to present evidence of Wiggins’s life history as “strategy.”  
Rather, the Court concluded that “counsel chose to abandon their 
investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed 
decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible.”140  This hold-
ing breaks no new doctrinal ground, as Strickland itself insisted that a 
reviewing court must consider the reasonableness of the investigation 
that underlies any strategic decision.141  But Wiggins reflects a new will-
ingness on the part of the Court to apply this requirement with some 
vigor.  Whether this vigor will extend outside of the capital context 
has yet to be tested in the Supreme Court.  Second, the Court noted 
that it was “standard practice” in Maryland to prepare a social history 
of the defendant in capital cases, a practice also endorsed by the ABA 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases.142  Once again, the Court took pains to note that 
it was merely applying Strickland rather than revising it, but the shift 
from Strickland’s reference to ABA standards as “only guides” to Wig-
 
139 Id. at 516. 
140 Id. at 527–28. 
141 See id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984)). 
142 Id. at 524. 
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gins’s repeated reference to and quotation from the ABA’s death 
penalty Guidelines represents another unexpected shift in emphasis.  
This shift toward incorporation of ABA standards as the foundation 
of constitutional reasonableness—if extended outside of the capital 
context—could redound to the benefit of all criminal defendants, as 
the ABA has been considerably more “checklist” oriented in its con-
sideration of counsel’s duties than have the vast majority of courts 
applying Strickland.143 
On the other hand, the Wiggins Court’s consideration of the 
“prejudice” prong of the Strickland test, like the analysis of the Wil-
liams Court, relied on a distinctive feature of capital sentencing.  
While the Williams analysis relied on the distinctively moral nature of 
the substantive decision that capital juries are called upon to make, 
the Wiggins Court relied on a distinctive procedural feature of Mary-
land’s capital sentencing process—the fact that a single vote for life 
would not “hang” a jury, but rather would require the imposition of a 
life sentence.  The Supreme Court explained, “Had the jury been 
able to place petitioner’s excruciating life history on the mitigating 
side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror 
would have struck a different balance.”144  It is hard to see how this 
analysis offers any applicability to determinations of prejudice from 
inadequate trial presentations. 
The Court’s third capital sentencing reversal, Rompilla v. Beard,145 
was the most fact-specific and the least generalizable to any other 
context, capital or non-capital.  Rompilla’s lawyers had, like all of the 
others, failed to uncover a substantial amount of mitigating evi-
dence—in this case, evidence of a neglected childhood, serious alco-
holism within the family and on the part of Rompilla himself, and in-
dications of Rompilla’s serious mental illness and cognitive 
impairment.  Rompilla’s lawyers, like those of Wiggins, were experi-
enced, dedicated counsel who did a fair amount of investigation on 
his behalf, none of which had turned up this mitigating evidence.  
The Court held that Rompilla’s lawyers made one quite specific er-
ror—they failed to look at a file, available as a public court record, on 
which the prosecution had given notice that it intended to rely at sen-
tencing to prove a prior offense, similar to the one for which Rom-
 
143 The Court cited the ABA standards not only in Wiggins, but also in Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 
396 (2000), and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 & nn.6–7 (2005), a trifecta for the 
new relevance of ABA guidance—at least in death cases. 
144 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537 (emphasis added). 
145 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
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pilla faced capital sentencing.  It turned out that this file contained 
prison files with leads to all of the mitigating evidence that Rompilla’s 
lawyers had missed. 
The very specific nature of the error described by the Court—the 
importance of the prior conviction to the government’s sentencing 
presentation, the amount of notice that defense counsel was given of 
the prosecution’s intent to rely upon the court file, the ease with 
which defense counsel could have accessed the file, and the trove of 
relevant information that the file turned out to possess—renders it 
very difficult to identify any doctrinal proposition advanced by the 
case.  Moreover, the case was decided by a 5-4 margin, with Justice 
O’Connor as the decisive vote in the majority.  Justice O’Connor re-
tired only a few months later, and her seat on the Court was taken by 
Justice Alito, who had authored the Third Circuit opinion reversed by 
the Court in Rompilla.  This switch in personnel makes it even harder 
to say what Rompilla stands for—if anything. 
The combined effect of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla has been 
to hearten advocates of greater constitutional regulation of defense 
counsel by the courts.146  As the above discussion suggests, it is possi-
ble that these cases reflect (or may engender) a greater commitment 
to applying the Strickland test in a more demanding manner not only 
in capital sentencing proceedings, but also in ordinary criminal cases.  
More skeptical scrutiny by courts of lawyers’ post-hoc claims of “strat-
egy” (which are ubiquitous) and more consultation of expert assess-
ments of counsel’s basic duties (such as those provided by the ABA) 
would clearly improve, albeit modestly, the capacity of courts to regu-
late defense counsel under the Constitution.  But it is at least equally 
possible that the three cases reflect a special inflection of Strickland 
relevant only to the distinctive (and very small) context of capital sen-
tencing.  The simple fact that the Court chose to review only cases in-
volving challenges to representation in capital sentencing proceed-
ings, as well as the emphasis in the Court’s analyses on special 
substantive and procedural aspects of such proceedings, suggests that 
the Court may be signaling (or may be interpreted by lower courts as 
 
146 See, e.g., John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”:  Williams 
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Ap-
proach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 129 (2007) (stating that 
these three cases “have provided some reason for optimism”); David Cole, Gideon v. 
Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington:  Broken Promises, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
STORIES 101, 125 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (stating that these three cases constitute 
“rays of hope”). 
  
Dec. 2008] OPENING A WINDOW OR BUILDING A WALL 199 
 
signaling) a greater willingness to scrutinize defense representation 
only in this limited context. 
Should this more limited view of the Williams, Wiggins, and Rom-
pilla trilogy trouble or dishearten the non-capital criminal defense 
bar?  On the one hand, one could take the “camel’s nose” view and 
posit that capital defendants represent the “thin edge of the wedge” 
that will eventually shift the intensity of the scrutiny (from less to 
more) that courts accord the adequacy of defense counsel services in 
all cases.  On the other hand, as this Article argues more generally, 
there is a risk that special treatment of capital cases is premised on its 
inapplicability to the much larger and much more potentially destabi-
lizing mass of ordinary criminal defendants.  Moreover, there is the 
further, more troubling possibility that the special attention paid to 
the representation of capital litigants will obscure or even work to le-
gitimate the general system of indigent defense representation.  As 
noted above, the failures of capital trial lawyers are generally brought 
to light only when new counsel are appointed during state or federal 
post-conviction proceedings, and these new counsel perform the in-
vestigation that trial counsel failed to do.  Two features of the world 
of ordinary criminal cases work against the possibility of real scrutiny 
of defense counsel preparation and investigation.  First, as noted 
above, only capital defendants are routinely appointed counsel in 
post-conviction proceedings.  Thus, despite the very real possibility 
that ordinary criminal defense counsel will fail to investigate ade-
quately, there is little chance that any inadequacy will be brought to 
light for the vast majority of criminal defendants who cannot afford 
to privately fund post-conviction counsel.  Greater doctrinal insistence 
on scrutiny of defense counsel services will do little in the absence of 
some mechanism to bring inadequate representation to the attention 
of courts. 
Second, unlike most capital defendants, the vast majority of ordi-
nary criminal defendants plead guilty, often on the basis of advice of-
fered after inadequate preparation and investigation by their lawyers.  
Exactly how often, however, is anyone’s guess because the adequacy 
of the preparation, investigation, and advice offered to defendants 
who plead guilty routinely escapes judicial review.  This is not because 
Strickland doesn’t apply in the guilty plea context.  Rather, defendants 
who plead guilty and later seek to overturn their convictions on the 
grounds of inadequate representation must demonstrate “prejudice” 
in the form of a reasonable probability that they would not have pled 
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guilty but rather would have insisted on going to trial.147  Merely show-
ing that adequate preparation or investigation would have allowed 
defense counsel to strike a better deal is insufficient.  Given the often 
vast differential between the sanctions that defendants risk if they go 
to trial and the plea bargains that they are offered,148 it will be ex-
traordinarily difficult to demonstrate in any particular case that a de-
fendant would not have pled guilty at all. 
These structural impediments to any substantial judicial review of 
the adequacy of defense counsel preparation and investigation in the 
vast majority of ordinary criminal cases mean that doctrinal shifts in 
the intensity of scrutiny under the Strickland standard will be largely 
meaningless, even if they extend more broadly outside of the capital 
context.  But the appearance of tough scrutiny, especially by the Su-
preme Court, may well create the false impression, especially to the 
uninitiated, that our criminal justice system is far more intensively 
regulated than it really is.  This real possibility of legitimization can 
increase the resistance to the necessary legislative action that will al-
ways lie at the heart of any real reform of the way that indigent de-
fense services are delivered. 
C.  Federal Habeas Corpus Review 
The constitutional doctrines regarding proportional punishment 
and effective assistance of counsel both privilege capital litigants over 
non-capital litigants—the first formally through the creation of two 
separate lines of doctrine, and the second informally through differ-
ential application of the same doctrinal framework.  In the preceding 
two sections, we explored the possibility that the “differentness” of 
death cases might necessarily exclude greater doctrinal scrutiny in 
non-capital cases, and indeed might even work to obscure or legiti-
mate troubling practices in ordinary criminal cases.  We concede that 
our concerns have yet to be confirmed empirically; moreover, our 
suspicions are by their nature difficult to verify or measure, even if 
completely accurate.  In contrast to the necessarily speculative and 
slippery possibilities that we chart above, the recent revolution in the 
structure of federal habeas corpus review presents a different set of 
issues regarding the way that capital cases may affect the administra-
tion of the broader criminal justice system. 
 
147 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment). 
148 See generally John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978) 
(criticizing vast sentencing differentials between trials and plea bargains). 
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In the habeas context, rather than receiving especially solicitous 
constitutional treatment to the exclusion of ordinary criminal cases, 
capital cases became the archetype that ushered in new procedural 
barriers to constitutional relief for all criminal defendants.  More-
over, in this context, there is no need to speculate about the effect 
that capital cases have had on criminal law and procedure; rather, the 
results are plainly written in the provisions of AEDPA.149  The AEDPA 
experience draws our attention to the darker shadows that inevitably 
accompany the bright light that capital cases shine on the criminal 
justice system.  Just as wrongful convictions and inadequate counsel 
seem that much more compelling in the capital context and can draw 
media attention and law reform efforts that ordinary criminal cases 
cannot, the pathologies of capital litigation—especially the extraor-
dinary lengths of time that often elapse between conviction and exe-
cution—draw more than their share of attention as well.  The reform 
of federal habeas review is an example of how the window-opening 
potential of capital litigation can lead to the building of insurmount-
able walls in the form of formidable procedural impediments to con-
stitutional relief. 
The scope and availability of federal habeas corpus review of state 
criminal convictions became a persistent issue, both for the federal 
judiciary and for Congress, in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury in the wake of the Supreme Court’s incorporation through the 
Fourteenth Amendment of almost all of the criminal provisions of 
the Bill of Rights.  With new and often imprecisely defined constitu-
tional rights in state criminal proceedings, state prisoners flooded the 
federal courts with petitions for habeas relief from unconstitutional 
confinement.  For decades, Congress considered (and sometimes 
passed) legislation refining the scope and availability of the writ,150 
and the Supreme Court continually reconsidered its approach to key 
questions regarding the effect of state procedural defaults,151 the ret-
roactivity of federal habeas judgments,152 and the preconditions for 
 
149 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1217–26 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
150 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (chronicling sev-
eral decades of proposed legislation to amend the federal habeas statute). 
151 Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that state procedural defaults foreclose 
federal habeas review only if the defendant deliberately bypassed state procedures), with 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (holding that state procedural defaults foreclose 
federal habeas review unless the defendant can show cause and prejudice). 
152 Compare Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (holding that the retroactive applica-
tion of new constitutional rules in federal habeas cases depends on a consideration of 
various factors on a case-by-case basis), with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) 
 
  
202 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
holding federal evidentiary hearings.153  Finally, in response to the 
Oklahoma City bombings and concerns that those responsible would 
not be executed in a timely fashion, Congress acted to alter the struc-
ture of federal habeas so as to ensure an “effective death penalty”—
the “EDP” in the AEDPA statute.  AEDPA represents the most recent 
and radical rewriting of the federal habeas statute—a reworking that 
has substantially inhibited the ability of the federal courts to enforce 
the federal constitutional rights of both capital and non-capital peti-
tioners. 
AEDPA’s most radical departure is, of course, the new standard of 
review, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), forbidding the granting of 
the writ unless the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that 
was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law.”154  By a narrow margin, the Supreme Court 
concluded in Williams v. Taylor155 that the statutory language did in-
deed require a profound change from the previously accepted de 
novo standard of review.  Two recent death cases reveal just how 
powerful the deference required by AEDPA can be.  In Brown v. 
Payton,156 Justice Breyer cast the crucial fifth vote for reversing the 
Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief to Payton on his capital sentenc-
ing claim.  Justice Breyer wrote separately to explain that he would 
have voted the other way on the Eighth Amendment merits, but that 
his resolution of the case was altered by AEDPA-required deference:  
“In my view, this is a case in which Congress’ instruction to defer to 
the reasonable conclusions of state court judges makes a critical dif-
ference.”157 
In a truly outrageous case of just a few months ago, Buntion v. 
Quarterman,158 a Texas trial court judge admitted to stating in open 
court that he believed he was “doing God’s work to see that the de-
 
(holding that new constitutional rules apply retroactively in federal habeas cases only 
when they prohibit certain primary conduct or adopt procedures “implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty”). 
153 Compare Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (listing six circumstances in which a fed-
eral evidentiary hearing is mandatory), with Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) 
(authorizing a federal evidentiary hearing only when a defendant can show cause and 
prejudice or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” would result if the hearing were disal-
lowed). 
154 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). 
155 529 U.S. 362, 403–05 (2000). 
156 544 U.S. 133 (2005). 
157 Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 
158 524 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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fendant Buntion gets executed,”159 among numerous other indica-
tions of his lack of impartiality in the high-profile capital case before 
him.  The federal district court judge who heard Buntion’s petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus granted him relief on his claim of judicial 
bias, but the Fifth Circuit reversed.  Describing the AEDPA standard 
of review as “highly deferential,”160 the Fifth Circuit explained that 
while the judge’s statements were “very troubling and hardly reflec-
tive of the high standards that judges should strive to maintain,”161 so 
much so that they resulted in a public reprimand from the Texas 
State Commission on Judicial Conduct,162 there was still no room un-
der AEDPA for upholding a grant of federal habeas relief. 
Obviously, the new deferential standard will pose similar hurdles 
for non-capital and capital defendants alike.  But some of the other 
provisions of AEDPA will prove to be even more onerous for non-
capital petitioners—rather ironically, since Congress’s stated intent 
was to ensure a more “effective death penalty.”  In particular, 
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, its absolute ban on same-
claim second petitions, its higher bar for filing new-claim second peti-
tions, its onerous exhaustion provisions, and its restrictions on fed-
eral evidentiary hearings pose hurdles that are much more difficult to 
clear for petitioners without appointed counsel.  Because there is no 
constitutional right to appointed counsel in habeas proceedings, and 
because only capital defendants are routinely provided counsel in 
state and federal post-conviction proceedings, it is the ordinary 
criminal defendant (the vast majority of whom are indigent) who is 
most impeded by AEDPA’s tighter requirements. 
One might counter this argument (that non-capital defendants 
have been harmed, perhaps disproportionately, by the restructuring 
of federal habeas motivated by the perceived excesses of capital litiga-
tion) by noting that non-capital defendants did not have much to 
lose, habeas-wise, in the first place.  This was Stephen Bright’s point 
during the live symposium that spawned this paper:  he observed that 
the typical non-capital defendant seeking habeas relief has no effec-
tive access to the courts without the help of appointed counsel, ren-
dering the right to habeas review essentially meaningless.  “I might as 
well fly a Boeing 747 by myself,” he quipped.  This is a fair point, find-
ing some support in a pre-AEDPA reported rate of federal habeas re-
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lief of only 1 in every 100 non-capital cases.  However, a recent study 
of the effects of AEDPA found that post-AEDPA, the rate dropped 
from 1 in 100 to 1 out of every 341 cases filed.163  One could say that 
either one of these rates is vanishingly small (Bright’s point).  But 
another crucial fact to note is the absolute number of non-capital ha-
beas petitions filed on a yearly basis—a number greater than 
18,000.164  Even a very low rate of success still represents a substantial 
number of cases, and undoubtedly some rather egregious ones (if the 
reported facts of the Buntion case are any indication).  So there is still 
some modest regulation of state court excesses going on in federal 
habeas review, and AEDPA’s more than three-fold reduction should 
count as a real loss. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Having challenged the comforting “window opening” story that 
death penalty advocacy and litigation promotes the interests of all 
criminal defendants, and having explored the darker story of the 
“wall building” potential of particular capital punishment strategies 
and doctrines, what is to be done?  Our purpose here is not to pro-
pose a solution to the conflicts that we chart.  We do not necessarily 
think that an “innocence” strategy or LWOP laws are always wrong-
headed, no matter what the context.  Nor do we mean to suggest that 
the Supreme Court’s “death is different” doctrinal edifice should be 
dismantled.  After all, it is entirely reasonable to believe that death is, 
in fact, different.  Rather, we seek to draw attention to the unrecog-
nized limitations and tensions that death penalty strategies and doc-
trines generate for the much larger population of ordinary criminal 
defendants.  To recognize that “death is different” is also to assert 
that incarceration (as opposed to death) is different, too—less severe, 
less final, less problematic, and less worthy of attention.  In light of 
our current crisis of mass incarceration, we need to be wary of any 
such implication. 
To be wary, however, requires being aware.  Once the potential 
conflicts between the interests of capital and non-capital defendants 
are recognized, it then becomes possible to try to gauge their severity 
and to structure advocacy and litigation strategies so as to avoid or 
 
163 See NANCY J. KING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS:  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE 
PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 52, 
58 (2007), http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/publications.html#F. 
164 Id. at 9–10. 
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minimize such conflicts.  Sometimes, a conflict might be so severe as 
to suggest that a death penalty reform (say, the passage of an LWOP 
bill) might, under the circumstances, be so likely to have such large 
negative effects on non-capital defendants as not to be “worth it.”  In 
such circumstances, even genuinely useful reforms may be worth for-
going or actively opposing (even unsuccessfully).  Whether to reject 
(and work to defeat) potentially harmful or legitimating reforms or 
whether to work around them depends on the relative weights of 
harm, legitimization, and reform, as we have suggested elsewhere.165  
Such weighing needs to be done, but it can be only if the community 
of capital and criminal defense lawyers—small and beleaguered as it 
already is—honestly confronts the issues that could potentially divide 
them.  We are thus doubly inspired to offer the above reflections—as 
scholars in pursuit of “truth,” of course, but also as reformers in pur-
suit of the best possible improvements to our criminal justice system 
as a whole. 
 
165 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative “Reform” of 
the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 424 (2002). 
